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SUE S. GUAN* 
ABSTRACT 
Over-the-counter (“OTC”) markets—those for currencies, derivatives, 
swaps, bonds, and commodities, for instance—make up an immense and 
critical component of global financial markets.  Certain benchmarks, such as 
the London Interbank Offered Rate (“LIBOR”), are hardwired throughout 
these markets and play crucial roles in pricing and valuation.  For example, 
interest payments on instruments ranging from student loans and mortgages 
to synthetic derivatives are tied to the value of LIBOR.  In 2016, estimates of 
notional exposure to U.S. dollar LIBOR totaled about $200 trillion—ten 
times U.S. gross domestic product (“GDP”) that year.  Correspondingly, 
minuscule variations in a benchmark’s value will impact vast numbers of 
assets and transactions for hundreds of millions of people. 
These benchmarks have become so ubiquitous for an important reason: 
they have introduced substantial harmonization effects in otherwise 
decentralized, opaque dealer markets.  These benefits fit within the prevailing 
view of financial regulation: because sophisticated market participants, 
through wealth-maximizing behavior, tend to select towards structures that 
maximize efficiency, in aggregate social welfare is maximized, meaning that 
observed equilibria are likely the most efficient equilibria.  And thus, OTC 
markets have remained largely unregulated for decades. 
This Article argues that this understanding is incomplete and identifies 
a fundamental misalignment between what is privately optimal and what is 
socially optimal in OTC markets.  By undertaking a structural analysis, this 
Article documents overreliance by market participants on benchmarks even 
when they are substantially suboptimal.  Thus, in contrast to existing reform 
proposals, which overwhelmingly assume that a single benchmark will 
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continue to dominate, this Article proposes an alternative competitive 
equilibrium—one where multiple benchmarks compete.   
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INTRODUCTION 
Financial trading markets are generally organized in one of two ways: 
exchange-based or over-the-counter (“OTC”).  Exchange-based markets, 
such as the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”), function similarly to 
auction markets, where buyers and sellers submit prices at which they are 
willing to transact, and transactions take place at the highest bid to buy and 
lowest offer to sell.1  These exchange-based markets are highly regulated and 
 
 1. For a broader explication of exchange-based equities markets, see generally MERRITT B. 
FOX, LAWRENCE R. GLOSTEN & GABRIEL V. RAUTERBERG, THE NEW STOCK MARKET: LAW, 
ECONOMICS, AND POLICY (2019).  Most stock purchases and sale transactions take place on 
exchanges.  Such markets are largely transparent, anyone can participate, and little is left to 
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feature a centralized limit order book that coordinates participants’ price 
quotes and executions.2  OTC markets are the opposite.  They are 
decentralized dealer markets, characterized by bilateral transactions between 
an end user and a dealer such as Goldman Sachs or another large market-
making entity.3   
OTC markets developed as marketplaces for assets that may not be as 
standardized or as liquid as those more commonly traded on exchanges.  
Interest rate products, bonds, foreign exchange products, complex 
derivatives, and many commodities are traded on OTC markets.4  Although 
OTC markets receive less academic and regulatory attention than exchange-
based ones, a vast amount of trading takes place on them, with estimates of 
notional value often in the hundreds of trillions of dollars.5  For example, in 
2018, estimates of OTC derivatives markets measured over $550 trillion in 
notional amount outstanding.6  Over $5 trillion a day turns over in the 
markets for foreign currency alone.7 
This Article is concerned with OTC markets that rely on benchmarks, 
such as the London Interbank Offered Rate (“LIBOR”) or the WM/Reuters 
 
negotiate.  The best executable price quotes are consolidated and made available to market 
participants, often on a central limit order book, and exchanges have little ability to exclude anyone 
from access.  Almost every aspect of such exchanges is heavily regulated: the providers of the 
exchanges (now for-profit companies), those who can transact on an exchange (broker-dealers), 
their duties to counterparties, what right (if any) exchanges have to exclude would-be participants, 
what trades and quotes must be reported, and to whom, rules of competition between exchanges, 
and so forth. 
 2. See id. 
 3. For purposes of this Article, I will use “OTC markets” to refer to markets in which non-
equities OTC assets are traded. 
 4. See, e.g., Gabriel V. Rauterberg & Andrew Verstein, Assessing Transnational Private 
Regulation of the OTC Derivatives Market: ISDA, the BBA, and the Future of Financial Reform, 54 
VA. J. INT’L L. 9, 11–13 (2013) [hereinafter Rauterberg & Verstein, Transnational Regulation]; 
Vincent Glode & Christian C. Opp, Over-the-Counter vs. Limit-Order Markets: The Role of 
Traders’ Expertise 1 (Nov. 8, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2697281.  In addition, some derivatives, such 
as exchange-traded options and futures, are traded on exchanges. 
 5. See, e.g., BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, MONETARY & ECON. DEP’T, STATISTICAL 
RELEASE: OTC DERIVATIVES STATISTICS AT END-DECEMBER 2015 2 (2016), 
https://www.bis.org/publ/otc_hy1605.pdf; Dan Awrey, The Mechanisms of Derivatives Market 
Efficiency, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1104, 1107 (2016) [hereinafter Awrey, Derivatives Market 
Efficiency] (identifying $493 trillion in global derivatives markets); Colleen M. Baker, Regulating 
the Invisible: The Case of Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1287, 1299–
1300 (2010) (noting that OTC derivative markets vastly exceed exchange-traded markets in size). 
 6. BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, GLOBAL OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET tbl.D5,  
https://www.bis.org/statistics/d5_1.pdf (last visited Aug. 23, 2020). 
 7. BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, TURNOVER OF OTC FOREIGN EXCHANGE INSTRUMENTS, 
tbl.D11.1, https://www.bis.org/statistics/d11_1.pdf (last visited Aug. 23, 2020); see also Dagfinn 
Rime & Andreas Schrimpf, The Anatomy of the Global FX Market Through the Lens of the 2013 
Triennial Survey, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS Q. REV., at 27 (Dec. 2013), 
https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1312e.pdf. 
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foreign exchange (“FX”) benchmark, to value or price the vast majority of 
transactions in those markets.  Staggering sums of money end up tied to 
benchmarks.  In 2016, estimates of total notional exposure to a single 
benchmark in a single region, the U.S. Dollar LIBOR, totaled about $200 
trillion—ten times U.S. GDP that year.8  Correspondingly, minuscule 
variations in a single benchmark will impact vast numbers of assets and 
transactions for hundreds of millions of people, sophisticated and 
unsophisticated.  Instruments ranging from student loans and home or auto 
mortgages, to complex hedges and synthetic derivatives, reference LIBOR,9 
which has often been called “the world’s most important number.”10  The 
impact of foreign currency benchmarks—the WM/Reuters FX rates—
extends into retirement funds and stock markets, where pension funds and 
stock indices (such as the S&P 500 and Dow Jones Industrial Average) all 
reference WM/Reuters FX rates in valuing investments and stocks 
denominated in foreign currency.11 
 
 8. Second Report of the Alternative Reference Rates Committee (Mar. 5, 
2018), https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/Microsites/arrc/files/2018/ARRC-Second-
report.com. 
 9. LIBOR is the most commonly used index for U.S. mortgages.  For an Adjustable-Rate 
Mortgage (ARM), What Are the Index and Margin, and How do They Work?, CONSUMER FIN. PROT.  
BUREAU, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/ask-cfpb/for-an-adjustable-rate-mortgage-arm-what-
are-the-index-and-margin-and-how-do-they-work-en-1949/ (last updated Nov. 15, 2019); see also 
Gina-Gail S. Fletcher, Benchmark Regulation, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1929, 1931 (2017) (noting that 
everything from consumer loans to commodity contracts and complex synthetic derivatives is tied 
to LIBOR); Gabriel Rauterberg & Andrew Verstein, Index Theory: The Law, Promise and Failure 
of Financial Indices, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 30 (2013) [hereinafter Rauterberg & Verstein, Index 
Theory] (tracing LIBOR’s dominance throughout short-term lending, from home and student loans 
to corporate borrowing and speculation); Darrell Duffie & Piotr Dworczak, Robust Benchmark 
Design 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 20540, 2018), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2505846 [hereinafter Duffie & Dworczak, Benchmark Design] (noting 
“[l]iterally millions of different financial contracts, including interest rate swaps, futures, options, 
variable rate bank loans, and mortgages, have payments that are contractually linked to LIBOR”). 
 10. See, e.g., David Enrich, Libor: A Eulogy for the World’s Most Important Number, WALL 
ST. J. (July 27, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/libor-a-eulogy-for-the-worlds-most-important-
number-1501170720; Matt Levine, Banks Will Miss Libor When It’s Gone, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 11, 
2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-04-11/banks-will-miss-libor-when-it-s-
gone [hereinafter Levine, Banks Will Miss LIBOR]; Matt Phillips, The Most Important Number in 
Finance Is Going Away. Wall St. Isn’t Prepared, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/19/business/libor-future-2021-phase-out.html; Barry Ritholtz, 
The World’s Most Important Number, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 13, 2018), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-04-03/the-world-s-most-important-number.  
 11. See Dow Jones Averages: Methodology, S&P DOW JONES INDICES 12 (Apr. 2020), 
https://us.spindices.com/documents/methodologies/methodology-dj-averages.pdf).  Economists 
have written broadly on the microstructure of OTC markets and the role benchmarks play.  See 
Darrell Duffie, Piotr Dworczak & Haoxiang Zhu, Benchmarks in Search Markets, 72 J. FIN.  1983, 
1984–86 (2017); Darrell Duffie & Jeremy C. Stein, Reforming LIBOR and Other Financial Market 
Benchmarks, 29 J. ECON. PERSPS. 191, 195 (2015); Duffie & Dworczak, Benchmark Design, supra 
note 9; Darrell Duffie, Nicolae Garleanu & Lasse Heje Pedersen, Over-the-Counter Markets (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 10816, 2004), https://ssrn.com/abstract=601118.  
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These benchmarks are in trouble.12  Beginning around 2008, evidence 
began emerging of manipulation and misconduct concerning one benchmark 
after another: LIBOR, the WM/Reuters FX rates, and ISDAFIX (a reference 
rate for interest rate swap rates), to name just a few.13  The harms have been 
vast.  Because so many transactions depend on benchmarks for payment or 
valuation, evidence has emerged that benchmark manipulation may have 
even exacerbated effects of the 2008 financial crisis.14  In the United States 
alone, implicated banks have paid billions of dollars—including through 
criminal penalties levied by the Justice Department, fines imposed by the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) and Federal Reserve 
Bank, and civil settlements in the Southern District of New York.15  Their 
employees have been terminated and sent to prison.16  Domestic and foreign 
regulators have entered into onerous transition and reform schemes.17   
A single benchmark, referenced throughout enormous markets, presents 
a particularly tempting target for manipulation.  With respect to LIBOR, the 
 
 12. Other scholars have identified susceptibilities to manipulation of benchmarks.  See, e.g., 
Fletcher, supra note 9, at 1931–33 (assessing the merits of ex ante and ex post regulation of 
benchmark-related wrongdoing); Rauterberg & Verstein, Index Theory, supra note 9, at 36–37 
(developing a taxonomy of indices and noting their susceptibility to under- and nonproduction 
because their promulgators are not able to internalize associated rewards); Andrew Verstein, 
Benchmark Manipulation, 56 B.C.L. REV. 215, 230–33 (2015) [hereinafter Verstein, Benchmark 
Manipulation] (examining reasons benchmarks are particularly profitable and tempting targets for 
manipulation and arguing that financial market manipulation is growing increasingly synonymous 
with benchmark manipulation). 
 13. See, e.g., Carrick Mollenkamp & Mark Whitehouse, Study Casts Doubt on Key Rate, WALL 
ST. J. (May 29, 2008), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB121200703762027135. 
 14. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Reforming LIBOR: Wheatley Versus the Alternatives, 9 N.Y.U. 
J. L. & BUS. 788, 798–99 (2013) (explaining that sustained underreporting of LIBOR may have 
worsened the financial crisis because lower rates would result in borrowers paying less on their 
loans, resulting in under-compensation for banks bearing the risks of such loans).   
 15. See, e.g., Portia Crowe, Wall Street Gets Slammed with $5.8 Billion in Fines for Rate 
Rigging, BUS. INSIDER (May 20, 2015), https://www.businessinsider.com/libor-rigging-criminal-
charges-and-fines-2015-5; Matt Levine, Bank FX Fine Scorecard (Follow Along at Home!), 
BLOOMBERG (May 20, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2015-05-20/bank-fine-
scorecard-follow-along-at-home-; Jill Treanor, Libor-Rigging Fines: A Timeline, GUARDIAN (Apr. 
23, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/apr/23/libor-rigging-fines-a-timeline. 
 16. See, e.g., David Enrich, Former Trader Tom Hayes Sentenced to 14 Years for Libor 
Rigging, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 3, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/tom-hayes-convicted-of-libor-
rigging-1438610483; Alexandra Stevenson, HSBC Bank Executives Face Charges in $3.5 Billion 
Currency Case, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/21/business/dealbook/hsbc-foreign-exchange-investigation-
currency.html. 
 17. See, e.g., Transition from LIBOR, N.Y. FED., ALT. REFERENCE RATES COMM., 
https://www.newyorkfed.org/arrc/sofr-transition (last visited Aug. 23, 2020); Staff Statement on 
LIBOR Transition, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (July 12, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-
statement/libor-transition; Financial Benchmarks, FIN. STABILITY BD., https://www.fsb.org/work-
of-the-fsb/policy-development/additional-policy-areas/financial-benchmarks/ (last visited Aug. 23, 
2020). 
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setting of which depended on thirteen or so large dealers’ self-reported costs 
of borrowing, banks’ derivatives traders needed only to convince the banks’ 
LIBOR submitters to over- or underestimate the rate on any given day to 
benefit those traders’ positions.18  This was successful because small 
distortions in LIBOR could generate very large profits on hefty outstanding 
positions for which payments depended on LIBOR.  For example, in a single 
quarter, a 25 basis point (0.25%) change in LIBOR could net $337 million in 
interest revenue for JPMorgan, and $936 million for Citigroup.19  And if a 
rate such as LIBOR were systematically overreported, interest rates on 
everything from mortgages to derivatives would be systematically too high.20 
Similarly, because the WM/Reuters FX benchmark reflected only a 
sliver of interdealer transactions during a one-minute window of time around 
4 p.m. each day, a would-be manipulator need not have controlled the global 
supply of a currency; they needed only to tweak the benchmark rate to which 
the global exchange rates are indexed.  For example, if Citibank received an 
order from a client who wished to purchase the New Zealand dollar (“NZD”) 
at the WM/Reuters 4 p.m. benchmark rate, Citibank would purchase the NZD 
and then sell it to the counterparty at the 4 p.m. fixing price.  If Citibank could 
ensure that other dealers did not interfere with its buying, then Citibank might 
be able to buy the NZD in ways so as to push the 4 p.m. WM/Reuters rate up, 
which could lead to Citibank then selling that NZD to its customer at an 
inflated rate.   
A few observations about these examples are worth noting.  First, the 
disparity between the size of the market snippet surveyed to create a 
benchmark and the size of the market indexed to that benchmark—and thus 
affected by manipulation—is enormous.  Second, a few dealers seem to 
possess outsize influence, both due to their involvement in the benchmark-
setting process and as counterparties to the same transactions indexed to 
those benchmarks.  Finally, reform has proved tricky, not only because of 
how deeply these benchmarks have permeated the markets, but due to the 
lack of viable alternatives.  As the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York stated in a recent speech, “[c]ontracts that reference U.S. dollar 
 
 18. See, e.g., Press Release No. 15-499, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Deutsche Bank’s London 
Subsidiary Agrees to Plead Guilty in Connection with Long-Running Manipulation of LIBOR (Apr. 
23, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/deutsche-banks-london-subsidiary-agrees-plead-guilty-
connection-long-running-manipulation; Press Release No. 13-161, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, RBS 
Securities Japan Limited Agrees to Plead Guilty in Connection with Long-Running Manipulation 
of Libor Benchmark Interest Rates (Feb. 6, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/rbs-securities-
japan-limited-agrees-plead-guilty-connection-long-running-manipulation-libor.  
 19. See Connan Snider & Thomas Youle, Does the LIBOR Reflect Banks’ Borrowing Costs? 
10, 12 (Apr. 2, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1569603.  
 20. See, e.g., Rauterberg & Verstein, Index Theory, supra note 9, at 4. 
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LIBOR continue to be written, which only serves to increase the level of 
systemic risk.”21  
Understanding how these structures arose and drawing insights to guide 
future reform is this Article’s central analytical aim.  Benchmarks such as 
LIBOR or the WM/Reuters FX rate have become ubiquitous for an important 
reason: they have substantially helped harmonize otherwise decentralized, 
opaque OTC markets.  These benefits fit the prevailing view in much of 
financial regulation: because sophisticated market participants, through 
wealth-maximizing behavior, tend to select towards structures that maximize 
efficiency, aggregate social welfare is maximized, meaning that observed 
equilibria are likely to be the most efficient equilibria.22   
This Article makes the claim that this understanding is incomplete and 
identifies a fundamental misalignment between what is privately optimal 
(i.e., for individual parties to a given transaction), and what is socially 
optimal (i.e., for the economy more broadly) in OTC markets.  By 
undertaking a structural analysis, this Article identifies significant distortions 
that have resulted from treating benchmark rates as “one size fits all”: (a) 
entrenched oligopolistic structures, (b) the temptation of manipulation and 
weakened incentives to monitor wrongdoing, and (c) stagnation around a 
suboptimal benchmark.  It argues that the “natural” oligopoly observed 
among powerful dealers in decentralized, opaque OTC markets, along with 
network effects and accompanying path dependencies, have encouraged 
inefficient lock-in and facilitated wrongdoing.  Suboptimal yet 
“systemically” important benchmarks have resulted, with skyrocketing 
switching costs for market participants and vanishing incentives to develop 
better benchmarks.  
Thus, this Article proposes an alternative competitive equilibrium—one 
where multiple benchmarks compete.  So long as a benchmark remains so 
entrenched in an ecosystem dominated by powerful institutions, there is little 
likelihood of innovation or competition from socially beneficial alternative 
benchmarks, and market-based discipline will remain ineffective.  Nor 
should the persistence of certain dominant benchmarks be taken to indicate 
their desirability.  Simply because OTC markets have historically been 
dominated by private ordering does not necessarily mean that the results of 
such private orders are indicative of optimal or efficient outcomes. 
 
 21. John C. Williams, President and Chief Exec. Officer, FED. RESERVE BANK N.Y., Remarks 
at the 2019 U.S. Treasury Market Conference (Sept. 23, 2019), 
https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2019/wil190923.   
 22. See generally, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 1–39 (1991); Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, 
Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972); R. H. Coase, The 
Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937); Oliver Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 
YALE L.J. 1197 (1984). 
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Existing reform proposals emphasize calculation methodology reform, 
enforcement, or turning over responsibility to the government.  All 
overwhelmingly assume that a single benchmark will continue to dominate.  
In doing so, these proposals ignore the deeper pathologies identified in this 
Article and invite a repeat of the same problems that plague one-size-fits-all 
benchmarks.   
Calculation reform, while useful, comes at a cost.  For example, 
widening the sampling window for the WM/Reuters FX benchmark 
calculation has introduced tracking error and potentially lowered the utility 
of such a rate to end users.  Moreover, total immunity to manipulation is 
impossible, and attempting to achieve it would be exceedingly costly.  
Enforcement and compliance will no doubt remain important.  However, the 
patchwork of fraud, manipulation, and antitrust regimes, and the difficulty of 
measuring harm or disgorging profits pose significant obstacles to both ex 
ante deterrence and ex post discipline.  Nor do such proposals address the 
problem of regulatory capture due to the systemic importance of a 
benchmark.  Relying on the government as a benchmark provider is also 
problematic, and likely to be slow, cumbersome, and costly.  Nor is there any 
guarantee that the government would get it right.23   
Competition among multiple benchmarks, by contrast, can benefit 
participants market-wide by encouraging innovation, transparency, the 
development of better information, and entry by more efficient providers.  
Benchmarks would be nimbler, less systemically important, and less 
tempting and more difficult to manipulate. 
Additional benchmarks would, critically, significantly lower the cost for 
end users of switching from one benchmark to another.  Stagnation around a 
single benchmark could be more easily avoided, and wealth-promoting 
innovation and updating around existing and new benchmarks could occur 
(with the proper incentives).  Reduced hardwiring of a single benchmark 
 
 23. See infra Part IV.A.  For example, in the U.S., regulators have settled on the secured 
overnight financing rate (“SOFR”), a measurement of banks’ overnight borrowing rate (secured by 
Treasury securities), as the sole designated LIBOR replacement.  LIBOR had flaws, to be sure.  But 
so does SOFR: the markets for SOFR can be finicky and overly dependent on volatility spurts 
related to funding market idiosyncrasies.  SOFR, an average of past transactions, should also not 
necessarily be viewed as a satisfactory substitute for LIBOR, a credit-sensitive term 
rate.  Importantly, SOFR is backward-looking, while LIBOR is forward-looking.  For many 
borrowers, interest rates pegged to future economic movements will be much more useful than those 
that will always lag the market.  These differences mean that, to fully transition to SOFR, market 
participants will need to understand and calculate mathematical relationships between LIBOR and 
SOFR for many contracts with payment obligations extending far into the future, an exceedingly 
costly endeavor.  Any issues will be exacerbated because banks, the main players in OTC markets, 
are better off when they can match their lending revenue with their borrowing costs.  LIBOR, which 
measures banks’ cost of borrowing from each other, was actually an excellent rate at which to lend: 
banks’ revenue from loans made at LIBOR would match their cost of borrowing from each other, 
allowing a match between assets and liabilities. 
  
2020] BENCHMARK COMPETITION 9 
would also make market discipline more effective by reducing not only the 
temptation to manipulate (by lowering the upside), but also a benchmark’s 
systemic impact.   
This Article proceeds as follows.  Part I explicates the social functions 
of financial trading markets, introduces OTC markets, and describes their 
basic dealer-mediated structure.  Dealers’ expertise, superior information, 
and lower cost of providing liquidity in bespoke, decentralized markets have 
resulted in their natural dominance.  As a byproduct of their market-making 
business, dealers amass information and acquire expertise, creating a kind of 
“natural” oligopoly.  Part II explores the “private” disciplining structures in 
OTC markets and how benchmarks can exert radical standardizing effects 
and generate efficiencies and social value for a wide swath of OTC market 
participants.  Part III considers the limits of such structures, seeking to 
understand how dealer-promulgated benchmarks then benefit from network 
effects and path dependencies that promote inefficient pooling around the 
“default” benchmark.  Negative consequences can snowball: oligopolies can 
entrench; “systemically” important benchmarks may result in the same way 
a bank can become systemically important; incentives to monitor 
wrongdoing can weaken; and manipulation may seem particularly tempting, 
especially when dealers both set a benchmark and are the counterparties to 
transactions that reference that benchmark.  Part IV discusses implications 
and avenues for reform.  So long as a benchmark remains so entrenched in 
an ecosystem dominated by powerful institutions, innovation or competition 
from socially beneficial alternative benchmarks will be unlikely, and market-
based discipline will lack credibility.  Thus, in contrast to existing reform 
proposals, which overwhelmingly assume that a single benchmark will 
continue to dominate, this Article advocates for a more fundamental 
approach.  An alternative competitive equilibrium is proposed—one where 
multiple benchmarks compete.  Benefits of introducing additional 
benchmarks and encouraging competition are considered, as are mechanisms 
for transition.  A brief conclusion follows. 
I. OVER-THE-COUNTER MARKETS 
While the focus of this Article is on benchmark-based OTC markets, I 
will first discuss OTC markets more broadly, their structures, and their 
capacity for generating social value.  Understanding these structures provides 
important background for understanding the emergence of financial 
benchmarks. 
OTC markets are dealer markets, which means that a dealer (such as 
Goldman Sachs) will be the counterparty to every transaction.  Dealers play 
critical roles in matching parties, facilitating transactions, and lowering 
search costs that might prevent participation in the markets at all.  Particular 
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attention will be paid to the consequences of dealer domination: as a 
byproduct of this role, dealers amass information and acquire expertise, 
creating a kind of “natural” oligopoly. 
A. Social Value of OTC Markets 
At their broadest, financial trading markets—regardless of structure—
serve important social purposes.  Beyond simply generating wealth for 
powerful players within them, properly functioning markets funnel 
participants’ profit-seeking activities toward actions that generate social 
value and help allocate real economic resources to projects that benefit the 
economy.24  The mechanisms through which this occurs differ from market 
to market, but in general, the more accurate prices are and the more liquid 
markets are, the more smoothly this process works.25 
If properly functioning, OTC markets can enhance the efficiency with 
which resources are allocated.26  Most importantly, they provide economical 
and flexible means through which firms and funds can efficiently hedge risk.  
Of course, improperly functioning OTC markets—like any market—will do 
the opposite.  At their worst, OTC markets can facilitate speculation, 
leverage, and socially harmful activities, which can have disastrous 
consequences for the economy and arguably played a role in previous market 
 
 24. Consider the market for equities—stocks.  Secondary trading markets for equities, such as 
the NYSE, incentivize information discovery about the value of corporations through relatively 
well-understood mechanisms.  As traders seek to profit off of information, buying if they believe 
the stock is undervalued, and selling if they believe it is overvalued, stock prices move toward levels 
that better reflect available information.  As more information is impounded into prices through 
trades, prices act as a signal for investors to further direct their capital accordingly.  For further 
detail, see generally, FOX, GLOSTEN & RAUTERBERG, supra note 1.   
 25. See, e.g., Merritt B. Fox, Lawrence R. Glosten & Gabriel V. Rauterberg, Informed Trading 
and Its Regulation, 43 J. CORP. L. 817, 832–35 (2018).  Price accuracy refers to the degree in which 
a price reflects the value of the asset.  Liquidity is a multidimensional concept that captures the cost 
of trading.  It touches on availability of the trade, possible prices, ease of transacting, and time 
required.  Additional considerations also bear on an evaluation of the desirability of any practice in 
financial markets: the real resources consumed (e.g., personnel and infrastructure), and the 
practice’s effect on favorable innovation, for example.  The more accurate prices are, and the more 
liquid markets are, the more easily resources can be directed to projects that generate the most social 
value, and the better the markets are able to promote core aspects of social welfare.  Tying into the 
Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis, or the idea that prices in the equities market reflect all 
available information, this underlies many regulatory goals, a disclosure-based legal regime, and 
prevailing views on corporate governance and enforcement (e.g., the use of fraud-on-the-market 
presumption).  Id.; see also Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market 
Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984). 
 26. See, e.g., Awrey, Derivatives Market Efficiency, supra note 5, at 1122 (explaining that 
derivatives markets, functioning well and embedding price expectations, enhance market 
efficiency); Joel Hasbrouck & Richard M. Levich, FX Market Metrics: New Findings Based on CLS 
Bank Settlement Data 3, 35 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 23206, 2017), 
https://www.nber.org/papers/w23206.pdf (noting the importance of liquidity to international 
currency markets and international trade). 
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crashes.27  Below, I provide an example of a socially useful OTC transaction.  
Because it is customizable, a swap (a kind of OTC derivative) can provide a 
precise hedge for the idiosyncratic business risk that a particular firm faces.   
One of the largest risks to the profitability of an airline’s business is 
rising jet fuel prices.  For example, if jet fuel prices rise, Delta Air Lines’s 
profits will decline.  In order to manage this risk, or hedge its exposure, Delta 
might enter into a jet fuel swap.  Such a swap will ensure that rising or falling 
fuel prices will not cripple Delta’s profitability.  Structured as a fixed-for-
floating swap (one party pays a fixed price in return for a floating, or market, 
price over some period of time), if fuel prices rise, Delta receives payment 
that directly offsets the higher prices it may have to pay in the market for 
fuel.  As a result, Delta becomes indifferent to otherwise volatile changes in 
fuel costs.  In this way, swaps can be tailored to hedge a multitude of other 
commodity risks, interest rate risks (the risk that a company’s borrowing 
costs rise), foreign exchange rate risks, and so forth.  Indeed, Delta’s 2019 
second quarter financial report makes note of derivative contracts (both 
exchange-traded and OTC) used to hedge fuel price risk, interest rate risk, 
and foreign exchange risk.28 
This example illustrates the usefulness of OTC products in allocating 
risks onto parties better able to bear them.29  The above swap was particularly 
useful because it could be precisely customized.  Delta could arrange for 
payment and delivery on the same dates on which it would need to obtain 
fuel.  To cite an example from a different industry, an executive at 
MillerCoors has stated: “[We] use over-the-counter swaps to precisely match 
the timing and prices of our complex manufacturing and distribution 
process . . . .  [W]e match our OTC swaps for aluminum with the actual use 
of cans over the same exact timeframe.”30  End users of such OTC products 
 
 27. This is a common criticism leveled at OTC markets.  See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, Derivatives 
and the Legal Origin of the 2008 Credit Crisis, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1, 3–4, 22–29 (2011) (arguing 
that the 2008 credit crisis directly resulted from removing the Commodities Futures Modernization 
Act’s ban on speculative trading in OTC derivatives). 
 28. Delta Air Lines, Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 12 (June 30, 2019), 
http://d18rn0p25nwr6d.cloudfront.net/CIK-0000027904/43093a3a-581e-4dc0-8f23-
499bb7031e64.pdf. 
 29. Kathryn Judge, Investor-Driven Financial Innovation, 8 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 291, 322 
(2018) (contrasting reallocation of risk through financial market activity with hedging exogenous 
risks with derivatives). 
 30. Assessing the Regulatory, Economic, and Market Implications of the Dodd-Frank 
Derivatives Title, Hearing Before the Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 52 (2011) (statement of 
Craig Reiners, Director of Risk Management, MillerCoors), 
https://play.google.com/books/reader?id=kFZGAQAAMAAJ&hl=en&pg=GBS.PA52; see also 
Bruce Tuckman, Derivatives: Understanding Their Usefulness and Their Role in the Financial 
Crisis, 28 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 62, 63–64 (2016), 
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jacf.12159. 
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range from Delta Air Lines to institutional portfolio managers31 to sovereign 
states,32 and such transactions are prevalent throughout a wide range of 
industries.33  This kind of customization34 can help a company alleviate large 
components of business risk35 that might otherwise jeopardize its operations 
or make its day-to-day continuation significantly more uncertain,36 or lower 
certain kinds of risk in an investment portfolio.37 
 
 31. See, e.g., Momtchil Pojarliev & Richard M. Levich, Should Investors Avoid or Seek Out 
Currency Risk? How to Resolve a Long-Standing Puzzle, 2 J. FIN. PERSPS. (2014). 
 32. See Henry T.C. Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes of Informational Failure and 
the Promise of Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1457, 1466 n.39 (1993) (noting that as 
early as 1991, governments have been party to hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of interest rate 
and currency swaps); John Kiff, Uri Ron, & Shafiq Ebrahim, The Federal Government’s Use of 
Interest Rate Swaps and Currency Swaps, BANK OF CAN. R. 23–24 (2000–01) (noting Canada’s 
billions of dollars’ worth of interest rate swaps and currency swaps used to manage foreign currency 
risk); Benn Steil, Central Bank Currency Swaps Tracker, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 1, 4 
(Nov. 5, 2019), https://www.cfr.org/international-finance/central-bank-currency-swaps-since-
financial-crisis/p36419#!/ (noting the importance of U.S. Federal Reserve swaps in responding to 
the 2007 crisis). 
 33. See, e.g., Apple Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 26–27 (Sept. 28, 2019), 
http://d18rn0p25nwr6d.cloudfront.net/CIK-0000320193/1a919118-a594-44f3-92f0-
4ecca47b1a7d.pdf; General Electric Company, Annual Report (Form 10-K) 147–48 (Dec. 31, 
2018), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/40545/000004054519000014/ge10-k2018.htm 
(reporting $1.5 billion in derivatives hedges); UnitedHealth Group Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-
K) 46 (Dec. 31, 2018), 
https://www.unitedhealthgroup.com/content/dam/UHG/PDF/investors/2018/UNH-Q4-2018-
Form-10-K.pdf) (reporting $14 billion of assets and $9 billion of liabilities with variable interest 
rates, directly or via interest rate swaps); The Value of Derivatives, INT’L SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES  
ASS’N (2014), https://www.isda.org/a/qJEDE/isda-final-2014.pdf (discussing how firms across a 
multitude of industries rely on OTC derivatives to manage business and financial risks, enabling 
them to better serve their clients). 
 34. In a three-month study of interest rate derivatives, over 10,500 traded combinations of 
product, currency, and tenor were observed (roughly 4,300 combinations just once).  Michael 
Fleming, John Jackson, Ada Li, Asani Sarkar & Patricia Zobel, An Analysis of OTC Interest Rate 
Derivatives Transactions: Implications for Public Reporting 3 (Mar. 2012), FED. RES. BANK N.Y. 
Staff Report No. 557, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2030461. 
 35. This is especially true for the component of firm-specific risk that cannot be diversified 
away.  See, e.g., Edward G. Fox, Merritt B. Fox & Ronald J. Gilson, Economic Crisis and the 
Integration of Law and Finance: The Impact of Volatility Spikes, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 325, 330 
(2016) (noting differences between firm-specific—or idiosyncratic—risk and market-wide—or 
systemic—risk). 
 36. This is not to say that there are not costs or tradeoffs to OTC market usage.  Greater 
flexibility in customization usually entails greater risk, in counterparty risk, default risk, and simple 
valuation risk.  See Hu, supra note 32, at 1465–67 (describing benefits to derivatives, such as 
lowered transaction costs and cheaper and more flexible risk management); Kiff, Ron & Ebrahim, 
supra note 32, at 24 (explaining that swaps are useful because they are private and customizable, 
but also have counterparty risk and lock in costs). 
 37. For example, economists have modeled the beneficial effects of both passive and active 
hedging of currency risk in portfolios, demonstrating that they reduce volatility and generate better 
returns.  See, e.g., Pojarliev & Levich, supra note 31, at 2, (arguing for institutional investments in 
currency because they are resilient, liquid, and tend to be imperfectly correlated with other aspects 
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B. OTC Market Structures 
This Part lays out the attendant structures in OTC trading markets and 
highlights an important aspect of transactions such as the example described 
for Delta: the importance of intermediaries.  Usually large banks such as 
Goldman Sachs or other large market-making entities, dealers serve 
particularly crucial functions in OTC markets due to (a) such markets’ lack 
of a centralized coordination mechanism for transactions, such as a limit 
order book; and (b) parties’ needs for complex, bespoke instruments and 
transactions. 
This Part will explain that as OTC markets have expanded, these dealers 
have grown even more important, attaining a “natural” oligopoly of sorts 
through the superior information and expertise acquired as a byproduct of 
their market-making business.  First, I discuss dealers’ roles in providing 
liquidity.  Then, I focus on the information asymmetries that persist in these 
markets.  Finally, this Part explores the oligopolistic nature of dealers’ roles 
in OTC markets. 
1. Dealer-Mediated Liquidity 
Dealers provide liquidity in OTC markets.  OTC markets lack 
coordinated or centralized sources, such as a limit order book, through which 
a would-be participant could undertake its own search for a counterparty or 
compare the quotes offered by counterparties.38   
A limit order book, such as those featured on equities exchanges, 
consolidates the best executable price quotes (prices at which buyers and 
sellers are willing to enter into transactions) and makes them available to 
market participants.39  Executions take place when a buyer is willing to pay 
a price that is equal to or higher than the lowest sale offer, or when a seller is 
willing to accept a price that is equal to or lower than the highest bid.40   
In a limit order book market, any entity can be the counterparty to a 
transaction.  The counterparty is largely random and will be whoever posts a 
price at which another is willing to transact.  In equities markets today, more 
often than not this is a high-frequency trader.41  By contrast, in a dealer 
 
of the market, including downturns and other cyclical events, as their values depend on relative 
economic strength). 
 38. See, e.g., Awrey, Derivatives Market Efficiency, supra note 5, at 1107–08, 1133. 
 39. See FOX, GLOSTEN AND RAUTERBERG, supra note 1.  For many years, there existed 
“specialists” on the stock exchanges, who were designated “market makers” and stood ready to 
provide quotes on a continuous basis.  These no longer exist. (Anyone can provide liquidity on a 
stock exchange today.)  See LARRY HARRIS, TRADING AND EXCHANGES: MARKET 
MICROSTRUCTURE FOR PRACTITIONERS 494 (2003). 
 40. See FOX, GLOSTEN AND RAUTERBERG, supra note 1, at 11–32. 
 41. See id. at 95–130. 
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market, which OTC markets are, a dealer will always be the counterparty to 
each transaction.  But the limit order book model, as we will see, in which 
anyone can provide liquidity or act as a counterparty to a trade, has limited 
viability for markets where transactions are highly complex or in which risks 
are bespoke and idiosyncratic.   
In the Delta example, because Delta has a business risk exposure to 
rising jet fuel prices, Delta is an end user of a jet fuel swap, or OTC 
derivative.  Rather than try and find a counterparty with the exact opposite 
exposure to fuel costs on matching future dates and in identical future 
amounts, Delta would most likely enter into a swap with a dealer such as 
Goldman Sachs.  Goldman could then enter into additional swaps with other 
end users, overall maintaining minimal exposure itself.42  In this way, both 
Delta and the would-be counterparty gain perfect hedges, while Goldman 
bears only minimal risk (and no business risk) that it is able to eliminate 
because it is counterparty to a huge volume of such transactions, earning fees 
on these transactions.43   
Goldman provides valuable flexibility, and likely at significantly lower 
cost than, for example, an oil refinery might.  Searching for a refinery with 
the same precise opposite exposure would also be expensive and time-
consuming, meaning firms might settle for imperfect hedges, leaving varying 
amounts of risk unmanaged.  Further, another end user (as counterparty) 
would most likely exhibit idiosyncratic settlement risk or default risk—risks 
that are exacerbated by the future-oriented nature of swaps and hedging 
instruments that contemplate continuing payment obligations of both parties 
over some length of time.44  Goldman is a far less risky counterparty.  
Dealers, who have superior resources and who are in the business of 
managing risk, are naturally better positioned to take on a counterparty role. 
In this way, dealers can contribute to market efficiencies by allowing 
risk to be allocated more efficiently.45  Dealers act as market makers.  By 
 
 42. See also Hu, supra note 32, at 1466–68; Sivaprakasam Sivakumar & Anita Mathew, 
Currency Swaps: An Instrument of International Finance, 21 VIKALPA 3, 4–5 (1996), 
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0256090919960201 (noting the transition from 
intermediaries bringing counterparties together to intermediaries acting as counterparties to the 
transactions themselves, reducing counterparty risk for end users). 
 43. See, e.g., Tuckman, supra note 30 at 63–64 (noting that the variability and idiosyncrasies 
of many end users’ needs (mismatched buyers and sellers) means that liquidity providers play 
important roles, providing immediacy and earning fees for the risks of doing so). 
 44. See Awrey, Derivatives Market Efficiency, supra note 5, at 1126–28. 
 45. See Rauterberg & Verstein, Index Theory, supra note 9, at 12; see also Lukas Menkhoff, 
Lucio Sarno, Maik Schmeling & Andreas Schrimpf, Information Flows in Foreign Exchange 
Markets: Dissecting Customer Currency Trades, 71 J. FIN. 601, 602 (2016) (noting that large 
dealers allow differing parties to share risk); Semyon Malamud & Andreas Schrimpf, An 
Intermediation-Based Model of Exchange Rates 4–5 (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper 
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packaging transactions for clients and being willing to take either side of a 
trade, dealers usually eliminate the resulting risk through offsetting 
transactions with other clients or other dealers.46  Access to a liquid 
interdealer market can also help hedge such exposure.47  Without ready 
intermediaries, search in an OTC market might be extremely costly.48   
2. Informational Advantages 
OTC market structures also tend to concentrate superior information in 
the hands of these same dealers.  There is little price transparency, price 
discrimination persists, and larger dealers are better informed as a result of 
their market-making activities.49   
Prices for transactions executed in an OTC market are known to the 
participants in any given transaction, but are rarely disseminated any 
further.50  End users must approach counterparties sequentially and engage 
in bilateral negotiating.51  Information is obtained only by requesting quotes 
from different dealers, which takes time and still does not necessarily tell end 
users anything about recent prices or the desirability of any given quote.52  
And, once a quote is agreed upon, it is difficult to monitor execution.53  
 
743, 2018), https://www.bis.org/publ/work743.pdf (observing that markups may decrease due to 
the overall lower risk exposure resulting from successful intermediation). 
 46. See Dan Awrey, Complexity, Innovation, and the Regulation of Modern Financial Markets, 
2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 235, 268 (2012) [hereinafter Awrey, Complexity]. 
 47. For example, in the foreign exchange markets, because dealers prefer to keep “flat” books, 
after taking one side of a transaction with a customer, that dealer will hedge the resulting exposure 
on the opposite side through the interdealer market.  See Michael R. King, Carol Osler & Dagfinn 
Rime, Foreign Exchange Market Structure, Players and Evolution 14 (Norges Bank Working Paper 
No. 2011/10, 2011), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1935858 [hereinafter King, Osler & Rime, FX 
Market Structure].   
 48. If the costs are great enough, entities may abstain from participating at all.  Thus, these costs 
act as a sort of wedge that potentially reduces gains from trade or results in risk remaining unhedged. 
 49. This is another crucial aspect in which OTC markets differ from exchange markets: in order 
for the price discovery mechanism to work smoothly in exchange markets, a multitude of 
regulations ensure relatively “fair” access to markets, prices, and information.  In exchange markets, 
no single entity—or concentrated group of powerful entities—controls the price discovery 
mechanism.  Anyone can be a market maker, and anyone can be trading on information.  Overall, 
the more information seeking there is, the more accurate prices tend to be.  See generally FOX, 
GLOSTEN AND RAUTERBERG, supra note 1, at 33–58; HARRIS, supra note 39. 
 50. There are some exceptions, for example, post-trade reporting through TRACE in the U.S. 
bond markets.  See Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (“TRACE”), FIN. INDUS. 
REGULATORY AUTH., https://www.finra.org/filing-reporting/trace (last visited Feb. 2, 2020). 
 51. See Awrey, Derivatives Market Efficiency, supra note 5, at 1133; Duffie, Garleanu & 
Pedersen, supra note 11, at 1; Glode & Opp, supra note 4, at 3.   
 52. See Awrey, Derivatives Market Efficiency, supra note 5, at 1133.  Indeed, certain banks 
have been fined for adding “silent” markups on quotes without informing their clients.  See, e.g., 
Plea Agreement at 3–9, United States v. JPMorgan Chase, 2015 WL 2441398 (D. Conn. May 20, 
2015) No. 3:15CR79(SRU).  
 53. See Awrey, Derivatives Market Efficiency, supra note 5, at 1128. 
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On the flip side, dealers amass information, almost passively.54  
Customer orders provide dealers with a constant stream of information.55  In 
foreign exchange markets, for example, empirical evidence confirms the 
informational advantages enjoyed by the largest dealers.56  Moreover, the 
general opacity of transactions enables dealers to engage in price 
discrimination and profit from their superior information.57  It is well 
documented that OTC markets see a variety of prices paid by differing clients 
for the same asset, making OTC markets more profitable for dealers.58  Price 
accuracy can suffer, especially as compared to an exchange on which assets 
are continuously traded, and where price transparency, liquidity, and 
immediacy limit the markups that a dealer can charge.59  Indeed, work has 
demonstrated that centralized, continuous trading multi-dealer platforms can 
help eliminate discriminatory pricing and equalize spreads paid by clients 
regardless of sophistication level.60  
These informational advantages grow as transactions and products 
attain increasing heterogeneity and complexity.  Returning to the previous 
example, Delta has a specific set of exposures it needs to hedge and a specific 
business risk profile.  MillerCoors has a completely different one.  Other 
 
 54. See id. at 1143–44. 
 55. See, e.g., Menkhoff, Sarno, Schmeling & Schrimpf, supra note 45, at 602 (finding that FX 
orders incorporate information about future rates). 
 56. See, e.g., Michael R. King, Carol L. Osler & Dagfinn Rime, The Market Microstructure 
Approach to Foreign Exchange: Looking Back and Looking Forward, 38 J. INT’L MONEY & FIN. 
95, 109–11 (2013) (discussing how those with large customers are better informed); Martin D.D. 
Evans & Dagfinn Rime, Microstructure of Foreign Exchange Markets 3 (Norges Bank Working 
Paper No. 6/2019, 2019), https://www.norges-bank.no/en/news-events/news-
publications/Papers/Working-Papers/2019/62019/ (noting in FX markets, these informational 
advantages most significantly come from customer orders, concentrated in large dealers); King, 
Osler & Rime, FX Market Structure, supra note 47, at 16 (discussing a study of FX dealers’ order 
flow concluding that larger dealers are better informed than smaller dealers).   
 57. See, e.g., Harald Hau, Peter Hoffmann, Sam Langfield & Yannick Timmer, Discriminatory 
Pricing of Over-the-Counter Derivatives 1–2 (Swiss Fin. Inst. Research Paper No. 17-70, 2017), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3099089 (finding that less sophisticated clients pay the most in FX 
derivatives markets, while client sophistication does not affect spreads on multi-dealer request-for-
quote platforms).   
 58. See DARRELL DUFFIE, DARK MARKETS: ASSET PRICING AND INFORMATION 
TRANSMISSION IN OVER-THE-COUNTER MARKETS (PRINCETON LECTURES IN FINANCE) 12 (2012).  
Dealers charge wider spreads when they have more information vis-à-vis their counterparties.  See, 
e.g., Hau, Hoffmann, Langfield & Timmer, supra note 57, at 1–2.  Similarly, spreads quoted 
between dealers in the interdealer market are usually narrower than those quoted to customers.  See 
King, Osler & Rime, FX Market Structure, supra note 47, at 15–16. 
 59. See Awrey, Complexity, supra note 46, at 268 (arguing that the dealer-centric structure in 
OTC markets has significantly impeded transparent pricing); Kathryn Judge, Intermediary Influence 
82 U. CHI. L. REV. 573, 615–16, 625 (2015) [hereinafter Judge, Intermediary Influence] (noting that 
prices in OTC markets may be less accurate than exchange-traded ones). 
 60. See Hau, Hoffmann, Langfield & Timmer, supra note 57, at 2 (finding in the FX market, 
the rents extracted by dealers with superior information are not observed in multi-dealer request for 
quote platforms). 
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companies, portfolio managers, and end users will have other idiosyncratic 
needs and risks.  Dealers, with expertise in multiple kinds of exposures and 
assets, will invest in the resources and models to understand and value 
complex transactions and instruments, acquiring even greater expertise as the 
market evolves.61  This reinforces an earlier observation: the limit order book 
model, in which anyone can provide liquidity or act as a counterparty to a 
trade, has limited viability for markets where transactions are highly complex 
or in which risks are bespoke and idiosyncratic.  This also helps clarify the 
value added by dealers: they are much better positioned to provide hedging 
instruments to end users such as Delta.  Thus, we arrive at a basic, 
unavoidable trade-off: intermediaries add significant value by structuring 
such transactions, but doing so also amplifies those same intermediaries’ 
substantial informational advantages vis-à-vis end users or clients.62   
3. “Natural” Oligopoly 
A natural monopoly occurs when a single supplier of services or 
products naturally dominates because it can more efficiently supply the 
market than its competitors can.63  While the antitrust literature contains a 
rich debate as to such structures, for our purposes it is sufficient to note its 
contours.64  Naturally arising monopolies or oligopolies result from supply-
side economies of scale, rather than demand characteristics.65  Understanding 
the structural profile of OTC markets—their dealer-mediated liquidity and 
persistent information asymmetries—as a “natural” oligopoly of dealers can 
provide valuable insights.   
Intuitively, it should not be too surprising that the markets described 
above tend to exhibit some characteristics of an oligopoly.  Certain 
efficiencies can be achieved by concentrating activity within large, expert 
dealers who can provide near perfect hedges while posing very little 
counterparty risk to an end user.  End users in OTC markets usually have 
one-off, idiosyncratic needs, with a somewhat fixed cost of doing business in 
OTC markets.66   Delta’s cost of negotiating additional jet fuel swaps may 
 
 61. For example, in the foreign exchange markets, customer demand for electronic platforms 
has driven investment in technology, which is expensive and can prove unprofitable for dealers with 
smaller market share.  This phenomenon may be exacerbated if dealers are incentivized to invest in 
transactions that enable high-fee, more complex products.  See Judge, Intermediary Influence, supra 
note 59, at 627. 
 62. See id. at 625. 
 63. See Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548, 548 
(1969).  Telecommunications or public utility industries are examples of natural monopolies.  Id. 
 64. See generally id. 
 65. See id. at 548. 
 66. See, e.g., Matt Levine, The Libor Change Is Coming, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 27, 2019), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-08-27/the-libor-change-is-coming [hereinafter 
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diminish after the negotiation of an initial one, but that diminishment cannot 
compare to the economies of scale that a dealer such as Goldman benefits 
from across its entire swaps business.  For Goldman, packaging additional 
swaps carries very low marginal additional cost and effort, and maintaining 
hedges across its book ensures that Goldman is largely indifferent to the 
additional minor risk taken on in any given single transaction.67  This also 
enables Goldman to charge lower prices than a competitor with fewer 
resources might be able to. 
Thus, it should not be a surprise that dealer activity in OTC markets has 
grown more and more concentrated.  Over time, a small group of very 
powerful dealers has grown to represent a disproportionate proportion of 
counterparties to transactions.68  For instance, a study at the end of 2010 
found that over 96% of the outstanding $217 trillion in derivatives contracts 
had one of the largest five banks as counterparty (Goldman Sachs, Bank of 
America, Citi, JPMorgan Chase, and Wells Fargo).69  Contrast this to 
exchange-driven equities markets, where trading activity is dispersed 
throughout the public, and liquidity could be provided by anyone.70   
End users’ ability to seek out a counterparty that is not one of the leading 
dealers is severely limited, and dealers acquire key “positional advantages,” 
including powerful relationships among themselves.71  A feedback loop 
results, through which increased concentration fuels dealers’ knowledge and 
expertise relative to clients, the markets, and even regulators.72  Dealers have 
 
Levine, The Libor Change Is Coming] (noting that there are “all sorts of reasons” that a bank’s client 
may have for entering into or exiting derivatives positions). 
 67. See, e.g., id. (“You, meanwhile, are a bank; your derivatives trades are all hedged, and you 
don’t care unduly about staying in or getting out of any particular trade.”). 
 68. Market power is not an uncontroversial concept, and scholars do disagree as to its 
measurement, in particular, whether market concentration suffices as a proxy.  See generally Awrey, 
Complexity, supra note 46; Louis Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 437 
(2010); Gregory J. Werden, Why (Ever) Define Markets? An Answer to Professor Kaplow, 78 
ANTITRUST L.J. 729 (2013). 
 69. See Judge, Intermediary Influence, supra note 59, at 619.  These are common statistics.  See 
Awrey, Complexity, supra note 46, at 268 (noting that in 2010, the fourteen largest dealers were 
counterparties to 82% of global outstanding notional in swaps) (citing David Mengle, Concentration 
of OTC Derivatives Among Major Dealers 1 (ISDA Research Notes, no. 4, 2010), 
http://www.isda.org/researchnotes/pdf/ConcentrationRN_4-10.pdf).  
 70. See generally FOX, GLOSTEN AND RAUTERBERG, supra note 1; HARRIS, supra note 39.  In 
fact, a key motivation for instituting the trade-through rule in equities markets was to foster 
competition: by mandating that orders must execute at the best available price regardless of which 
exchange that price is found at (i.e., if NYSE receives an order but the best available price is on 
NASDAQ, NYSE must route that order to NASDAQ), a small exchange, so long as it has the best 
price, is guaranteed order flow. 
 71. See Judge, Intermediary Influence, supra note 59, at 577–78, 617–18 (explaining that these 
can be characterized by formal or informal relationships, in-house expertise over bespoke 
transactions, control over a trading vehicle, etc.). 
 72. See id. at 577–78. 
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the benefit of volume, they often have the financial resources to invest in 
complex models that can more accurately value the relevant assets and their 
markets,73 and by simple consequence of acting as counterparty to the vast 
majority of transactions, information acquisition about the asset and the 
market in question is almost a passive consequence of their business.74  
Moreover, the opacity of prices and executions ensures that this information 
is not disseminated to their customers. 
OTC markets—through the basic dealer-mediated nature of transactions 
and the lack of a centralized coordination or pricing mechanism—have thus 
proven particularly susceptible to oligopolistic domination by a few large 
players.  The next Part seeks to understand the role of benchmarks within 
such markets. 
II. BENCHMARK HARMONIZATION 
As illustrated by the above discussion, the claim that OTC markets are 
completely unstructured and a financial free-for-all would be inaccurate.  
They have, instead, in ad hoc form loosely organized themselves around 
dealers’ activities.  This Part explores the degree to which standardization has 
been achieved by financial benchmarks such as LIBOR, ISDAFIX and FX, 
and how, as a result, they have grown to dominate default transaction choices 
in OTC markets. 
Generally speaking, left to their own devices, private markets can 
evolve in efficient ways.  This is because actors are naturally incentivized to 
acquire expertise and invest in structures that minimize transaction costs and 
maximize any resulting gain.75  This reflects a dominant view in much of 
corporate and financial legal thinking,76 and I will turn to it more fully in Part 
III.D.  For now, it is sufficient to note that this understanding has some 
explanatory power for the dealer-mediated structures in OTC markets.  
Without dealers, many of the costs to transacting in OTC markets identified 
above might otherwise deter would-be investors from participating in such 
markets at all, resulting in risk that remains unhedged.  But as we will see, 
dependence on the alignment between the market and its most powerful 
participants—dealers—for socially beneficial innovation can be a risky and 
problematic endeavor.  
 
 73. See King, Osler & Rime, FX Market Structure, supra note 47, at 29 (explaining that because 
FX trading is unprofitable for small dealers due to the cost of investing in trading technology, the 
share of trading concentrated in the few largest banks had grown to 40% by 2010). 
 74. See Awrey, Derivatives Market Efficiency, supra note 5, at 1143–44. 
 75. See Dan Awrey, The Limits of Private Ordering Within Modern Financial Markets, 34 REV. 
BANKING & FIN. L. 183, 191–93 (2014) [hereinafter Awrey, Private Ordering]. 
 76. See supra note 22. 
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A. Benchmark Introduction 
Financial benchmarks’ standardizing effects in OTC markets have been 
profound, especially with respect to price accuracy and liquidity, allowing 
end users and dealers alike to capture the resulting gains from lowered 
information asymmetries.  All OTC transactions—indeed, all financial 
transactions—hinge on price or payment terms, whether the immediate price 
of an asset, the schedule of payments for some time into the future, or some 
yet-to-be-determined payoffs conditioned on future circumstances.  Without 
benchmarks, negotiating each such price term can be costly, time-consuming, 
and inefficient.  End users might spend valuable resources doing so, pay 
higher or worse prices that reduce or even eliminate the benefit to entering 
into the transaction at all, or simply leave the market, potentially leaving risk 
unmanaged.  This Part focuses on how benchmarks can significantly reduce 
these costs. 
Some market segments rely more on benchmarks for coordination and 
informational transparency benefits than others.  These include foreign 
exchange markets, commodities, and those for certain interest rate products.  
Three examples of such benchmarks—LIBOR, FX, and ISDAFIX—are 
described below. 
LIBOR originated out of frustration with the rampant nonuniformity in 
the early days of obtaining loans (parties frequently disagreed as to interest 
rates, where to obtain reference numbers, and whom to obtain them from).77  
U.K. banks eventually requested that the British Bankers Association 
(“BBA”) standardize a means to calculate “the interest rates on syndicated 
loans.”78  This became LIBOR, which proved hugely useful in calculating 
banks’ funding costs easily and cheaply.79  By lending at LIBOR, which 
estimated their own costs of borrowing, banks were able to better match their 
lending revenue to their borrowing costs.80  By 2012, LIBOR was reported 
for ten currencies and at fifteen maturities for each.81  LIBOR has become 
the benchmark used globally to set interest rates—and through its 
incorporation, the benchmark used to “price” borrowing costs of entities all 
over the world.82  Frequently referred to as the “world’s most important 
 
 77. See Rauterberg & Verstein, Transnational Regulation, supra note 4, at 25 (citing Jeffrey B. 
Golden, Setting Standards in the Evolution of Swap Documentation, 13 INT’L FIN. L. REV. 18 
(1994)) (noting the contentiousness among market participants in deciding reference rates).   
 78. See Rauterberg & Verstein, Index Theory, supra note 9, at 30.  
 79. Id.  
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 16. 
 82. Id. at 3, 11; Verstein, Benchmark Manipulation, supra note 12, at 261 (noting ambiguities 
in the term “price”).  
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number,”83 referencing or relying on LIBOR is ubiquitous throughout the 
swap markets and debt markets—where it impacts everything from student 
loans and mortgages to complex hedges and synthetic derivatives (statistics 
pegged over $360 trillion to be indexed to LIBOR in 2008).84 
In 1994, WM/Reuters introduced Closing Spot Rates as a benchmark 
for currency prices.85  Calculated for over 150 currency pairs,86 the most 
important rates are those calculated at 4 p.m. London time, daily.87  
WM/Reuters FX rates have grown hugely influential in markets worldwide.  
The value of standardizing currency exchange rates so that portfolio 
valuations could be more easily and accurately measured has been enormous.  
WM/Reuters FX rates are referenced throughout currency derivatives and 
commonly used to calculate the value of foreign-denominated assets.88  This 
is especially important, as most major equity and bond indices (the S&P 500 
and Dow Jones, for example) as well as pension funds and mutual funds rely 
on the WM/Reuters FX rates to determine the value of foreign-denominated 
assets.89  The daily turnover of these instruments has been estimated at $5 
trillion.90   
In 1998, the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (“ISDA”) 
established the ISDAFIX, now known as the ICE Swap Rate, to act as a 
reference rate for interest rate swap rates.  ISDAFIX is less widely known 
but has had powerful standardizing effects in the market for swap derivatives.  
Published daily, ISDAFIX indicated the mid-market rate for the fixed leg of 
 
 83. See supra note 10. 
 84. See Duffie & Dworczak, Benchmark Design, supra note 9, at 2; Fletcher, supra note 9, at 
1931; Rauterberg & Verstein, Index Theory, supra note 9, at 3, 30. 
 85. WM/Reuters FX Benchmarks: Spot, Forward and NDF Rates Methodology Guide, 
REFINITIV BENCHMARK SERVS. 5 (Sept. 2020), 
https://www.refinitiv.com/content/dam/marketing/en_us/documents/methodology/wm-reuters-
methodology.pdf. 
 86. Thomson Reuters WM/Reuters FX Benchmark, REFINITIV 1, 
https://www.refinitiv.com/content/dam/marketing/en_us/documents/fact-sheets/wm-reuters-fx-
benchmarks-fact-sheet.pdf. 
 87. See, e.g., Martin D.D. Evans, Peter O’Neill, Dagfinn Rime & Jo Saakvitne, Fixing the Fix? 
Assessing the Effectiveness of the 4pm Fix Benchmark 1 (Oct. 22, 2018) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3270844.  For most of the relevant period, these rates were 
calculated by taking the median of the spot currency trades in the interbank market during the one-
minute window beginning thirty seconds prior to 4 p.m. and ending thirty seconds after 4 p.m.  Id. 
at 4.  
 88. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 89. See Evans, O’Neill, Rime & Saakvitne, supra note 87, at 2 (identifying $6 trillion in funds 
that reference indices with the WM/Reuters FX rates as inputs); Verstein, Benchmark Manipulation, 
supra note 12, at 235–36 (describing the vast reach of the WM/Reuters FX rates, including by being 
referenced by equities indices and investment funds). 
 90. See Rime & Schrimpf, supra note 7, at 27; Triennial Central Bank Survey: Foreign 
Exchange Turnover in April 2013: Preliminary Global Results, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS 9 
(Sept. 2013), http://www.bis.org/publ/rpfx13fx.pdf.   
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a vanilla (fixed-for-floating) interest rate swap.91  In 2014, ISDA estimated 
that the swaptions (options to enter into swaps) market itself comprised $30 
trillion in outstanding contracts.92  Almost all swaptions reference ISDAFIX 
in determining an exercise price (for a cash settled swaption).93 
B. Benchmark Discipline 
Benchmarks have facilitated tectonic informational shifts in OTC 
markets.  By very inexpensively coordinating the price discovery-like 
functions of dealers, benchmarks have had enormous benefits for the market, 
including enhancing price transparency, lowering the cost of contracting, 
expanding the range of hedging opportunities, and generating huge amounts 
of liquidity through network effects.  This Part considers each in turn. 
1. Price and Execution Transparency 
Benchmarks have essentially allowed ordinary market participants to 
leverage information capabilities of large dealers.  This has led to radically 
reduced information asymmetries and greater price accuracy. 
Consider two parties.  Party A holds an asset that pays a fixed rate of 
2.5% a month.  Party B has an investment that pays a variable interest rate 
each month.  If the two parties are dissatisfied with their payment streams, 
for example if Party B prefers the certainty of a fixed payment or Party A 
believes the market will outperform the rate it is entitled to, they can enter 
into an interest rate swap, whereby Party A pays its 2.5% to Party B and 
receives the variable rate from Party B.  The value of the variable rate will 
determine gains and losses to both parties (usually netted out). 
The value of the variable rate can vary enormously.  Overwhelmingly, 
it is tied to LIBOR.94  But consider a world without LIBOR, or without some 
market benchmark for interest rates.  It does not seem an exaggeration to say 
that an end user would have negligible ability to determine such rates.  
Contracts would likely vary wildly in borrowing rates.  But LIBOR 
introduces significant uniformity and predictability, not only for any given 
end user or borrower, but also across end users and borrowers. 
As another example, consider the world before foreign exchange 
benchmarks were introduced.  A company seeking to purchase foreign 
 
 91. ICE Swap Rate, INTERCONTINENTAL EXCH., https://www.theice.com/iba/ice-swap-rate 
(last visited Aug. 6, 2020).   
 92. The Value of Derivatives, supra note 33. 
 93. ICE Swap Rate, supra note 91. 
 94. See Levine, Banks Will Miss LIBOR, supra note 10; Karen Fernandez, The LIBOR Is a 
Global Interest Rate That Affects the Rates of Many Loans and Investments. Here’s How It’s Set, 
and Why It’s Slated to End, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 29, 2020), https://www.businessinsider.com/what-
is-libor.  
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currency would need to engage in a bilateral, iterative search for price quotes 
from dealers, and have little ability to monitor the actual execution of the 
transaction ex post.  With the introduction of WM/Reuters FX rates, that 
same firm need only request that its purchase be executed using the public 4 
p.m. WM/Reuters FX rates.95 
The reduced ambiguity and increased uniformity in transacting resulting 
from the introduction of benchmarks lowers the cost of entering into OTC 
transactions in the first place.  Rather than engage in a one-off transaction 
with a dealer who possesses superior information about the value of an 
asset—whether the correct pricing of a loan, the settlement value of a bespoke 
interest rate contract, or the exchange rate of any given currency—market 
participants can simply look to the aggregated agreed-upon price set by 
multiple dealers and capitalize on their knowledge.96 
Benchmarks also mitigate search frictions.  For end users and other 
traders, this can encourage efficient entry, enabling them to more easily 
identify “low-cost” dealers and decide whether to participate at all in the 
market.97  As pointed out in the examples above, a pension fund that needs 
to value foreign-denominated assets could simply request that its assets be 
benchmarked against the WM/Reuters fix, so that the fund does not need to 
engage in costly search.  Similarly, LIBOR enables end users to ascertain the 
suitability of a loan rate with less difficulty.98  This most benefits the least 
sophisticated customers, who might otherwise find the cost of participating 
in OTC markets too high.  Indeed, in FX markets, evidence demonstrates that 
the least sophisticated clients most frequently request trade execution at 
benchmark prices.99  These benefits are compounded because end users have 
much lower costs of ex-post monitoring of execution when they can employ 
benchmarks.  Reference prices will be public, reducing the risk of being 
fleeced by those with superior information.100  In this way, benchmarks may 
also incentivize better behavior by agents. 
 
 95. See supra text accompanying note 87. 
 96. Thus Duffie, Dworczak, and Zhu identify three main benefits of benchmarks in markets 
with persistent information asymmetries: contracts with formulas that settle by reference to a 
benchmark, enabling ex-post monitoring of execution quality, and the ability to compare quotes 
received to a benchmark.  Duffie, Dworczak & Zhu, supra note 11, at 5 (observing that in certain 
markets “[b]enchmarks would be almost redundant, from the viewpoint of pre-trade price 
transparency, if the best executable price quotes are published and accessible to all market 
participants, for example on an open central limit order book”).  
 97. Id. at 2 (noting that increased transparency can result in lowered quotes due to competition, 
which can, in turn, reduce wasteful search and promote business for low-cost or more efficient 
dealers since cost is more observable).  
 98. See Duffie & Stein, supra note 11, at 194. 
 99. Id. at 194–95. 
 100. Id. (noting that agent behavior will be easier to observe when benchmarks exist as a basis 
for comparison). 
  
24 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 80:1 
2. Contracting 
Price terms are often the most difficult to negotiate aspects of a long-
term contract, because of risks of opportunism and breach.101  But by 
incorporating a benchmark into a legally binding contract, parties can retain 
future flexibility without ceding certainty or clarity.102  For example, 
derivative contracts almost universally tie their payment conditions to 
benchmark values at multiple points into the future.103  By incorporating 
benchmarks as price terms either directly or by reference, for example 
agreeing to a loan that uses LIBOR as a term, or entering into a long term set 
of swaptions with settlement terms that periodically are determined by 
ISDAFIX, parties reduce the need to negotiate a complete price schedule ex 
ante.  The tricky (and sometimes impossible) endeavor of attempting to 
predict price fluctuations into the future becomes largely unnecessary thanks 
to financial benchmarks.   
Through benchmarks incorporated as price referents, then, parties are 
able to benefit from the expertise of dealers, or those who set the benchmarks, 
which can overall increase contracting efficiency.104 
3. Hedging 
All of these benefits accumulate to allow parties participating in OTC 
markets to better hedge and allocate risk.  A greater number of parties have 
access to an expanded range of instruments, more accurate prices, and 
increased liquidity.105  This Article began with the Delta example.  Consider 
a cross-currency swap, a transaction that can enable parties to achieve 
cheaper funds to support growth abroad.  If a U.S. company, Apple, wishes 
to expand operations in Japan and seeks Japanese yen, and a Japanese 
company, Sony, needs U.S. dollars to do the same in the U.S., the two 
companies can (through dealers) enter into a cross-currency swap.  This 
would be beneficial since, presumably, it is cheaper for Apple to borrow in 
U.S. dollars than in Japanese yen, and vice versa for Sony.  A cross-currency 
swap can provide a useful means to accomplish this: both Apple and Sony 
 
 101. See, e.g., Andrew Verstein, Ex Tempore Contracting, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1869, 
1877–78 (2014) [hereinafter Verstein, Ex Tempore Contracting]. 
 102. See Verstein, Benchmark Manipulation, supra note 12, at 226.  There is a rich literature on 
the benefits of “flexible and unambiguous” contracts.  See, e.g., id.; George G. Triantis, The 
Efficiency of Vague Contract Terms: A Response to the Schwartz-Scott Theory of U.C.C. Article 2, 
62 LA. L. REV. 1065, 1068 (2002); Verstein, Ex Tempore Contracting, supra note 101. 
 103. Hardwired into contracts in this way, benchmarks effectively act as the price.  See Verstein, 
Benchmark Manipulation, supra note 12, at 226–28 (also noting the commonplace nature of tying 
payment conditions to benchmarks rather than the price of, say, a commodity). 
 104. See Rauterberg & Verstein, Index Theory, supra note 9, at 11 (referencing Eastern Air Lines 
v. Gulf Oil for referring to the Platts oil price index as the arbiter of oil prices, rather than courts).  
 105. Id. at 11 (these benefits accrue to retail investors as well as institutional ones).  
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borrow in their respective domestic debt markets and swap the amounts.  
Interest rates paid by Apple and Sony on the loans are usually tied to LIBOR.  
Because LIBOR is designed to measure banks’ borrowing costs, lending to 
Apple or Sony at a rate tied to LIBOR means that banks can match their 
borrowing cost with their lending revenue.  If a bank’s cost of borrowing 
rises, then so does its lending revenue, and vice versa.106  In this way, LIBOR, 
if properly functioning, can make it easier for banks to hedge, which in turn 
should lower the cost of providing such a loan to Apple or Sony, which in 
turn can promote socially beneficial global growth.   
These hedging benefits are compounded due to the increasing linkages 
that characterize financial markets.  Using a single benchmark rate as a price 
term across many disparate transactions increases market actors’ ability not 
only to map risk and price across various transactions and even across various 
rates, but to better understand risk across multiple LIBOR exposures.107  If 
done properly, this reduces risk while facilitating greater or differentiated 
exposures. 
4. Network Effects 
In addition to first order information benefits, benchmarks have also 
generated enormous network effects, which greatly increase liquidity market-
wide. 
Widespread use generates additional liquidity, and increased liquidity 
attracts additional use.108  This sort of network effect, in contrast with the 
supply-side oligopolistic characteristics described above, is a demand-side 
phenomenon: the demand for a service or product is shaped by existing 
demand.109  In particular, network effects exist when the value to a user of an 
additional unit increases by simple virtue of additional users or units.110  One 
obvious example is a telephone, which would be useless if used only by one 
person, but which becomes more and more useful the larger the network of 
 
 106. This can be beneficial to banks in another way.  See Duffie & Stein, supra note 11, at 195 
(describing how adverse selection may impede a bank’s ability to hedge volatility in its own 
borrowing costs, because the bank has private information about its own credit risk, and 
counterparties might be justly wary of taking an opposite position). 
 107. See Rauterberg & Verstein, Transnational Regulation, supra note 4, at 25.   
 108. See THIERRY FOUCAULT, MARCO PAGANO, AND AILSA RÖELL, MARKET LIQUIDITY: 
THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND POLICY 310 (2013); Awrey, Derivatives Market Efficiency, supra note 5, 
at 1135–36 (explicating the mechanism by which liquidity generates liquidity: depth and volume 
promote price discovery, narrowing spreads and attracting more traders, which creates more depth, 
and so on); Awrey, Private Ordering, supra note 75, at 194–95 (examining the pull of network 
effects on markets). 
 109. See STAN J. LIEBOWITZ & STEPHEN E. MARGOLIS, WINNERS, LOSERS & MICROSOFT: 
COMPETITION AND ANTITRUST IN HIGH TECHNOLOGY 67 (2001). 
 110. See Nicholas Economides, Competition Policy in Network Industries: An Introduction 5 
(NYU Ctr. for Law and Bus. Research Paper No. 03-10, 2004), https://ssrn.com/abstract=386626. 
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people using it.111  Financial exchanges (such as the NYSE and NASDAQ) 
are another example.  Increased activity on the exchange increases the utility 
of any trader’s participation in the exchange.112  Benchmarks provide a 
similar benefit, as the more entities that measure interest rate risk using 
LIBOR, the more valuable LIBOR is in standardizing transactions and 
providing price information across otherwise disparate contracts.  In the same 
way that commonly used contract terms yield greater value by receiving 
increased clarity via judicial precedents, shared business practices, and utility 
of associated documentation, widespread adoption of a benchmark can bring 
significant benefits in the form of interoperability and transparency across 
otherwise disparate contracts and documents.113  Public bodies also cite to 
benchmarks (including directly in statutes and regulations), affording a 
presumption of validity to benchmark-linked prices and contractual terms.114  
These benefits are compounded for instruments of longer duration, for 
example, an interest rate swap that extends for several years into the future.115 
Financial benchmarks have vastly increased the notional value in OTC 
markets and reduced information asymmetries and search frictions, enabling 
more participants than ever to access the risk-shifting benefits bestowed by 
such markets.  That benchmarks would have such transformative effects 
makes sense,116 because network effects tend to be most powerful under 
circumstances with the greatest uncertainties.117 
But network effects also exert a pull in the other direction.  A widely 
relied upon benchmark with powerful network effects might cause more 
standardization across transactions than is socially beneficial or which might 
exist in an alternate equilibrium.  Marcel Kahan and Michael Klausner have 
identified this tendency in the corporate contracting context, arguing that 
network effects will cause contracts to be more standardized than in their 
 
 111. Id. at 9. 
 112. See, e.g., Carmine Di Noia, The Stock-Exchange Industry: Network Effects, Implicit 
Mergers, and Corporate Governance 9-10 (MARZO Working Paper No. 33, 1999), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=200991 (noting that the more liquid an exchange is, the more 
intermediaries and participants wish to trade on it, as the greater number of users raises the utility 
for all); Economides, supra note 110, at 5. 
 113. See Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. 
L. REV. 757, 761 (1995); Rauterberg & Verstein, Index Theory, supra note 9, at 14. 
 114. See Verstein, Benchmark Manipulation, supra note 12, at 227 (noting the presumption of 
validity often afforded to benchmarks cited by statutes, investment funds, retirement plans, etc.).   
 115. See Klausner, supra note 113, at 828 (describing this phenomenon in contractual choices).   
 116. See generally Frank Partnoy, Second-Order Benefits from Standards, 48 B.C.L. REV. 169 
(2007) (observing that some of the most important benefits from such coordination achievements 
are those having to do with standard setting and network effects). 
 117. See Klausner, supra note 113, at 784 (describing that network effects tend to be largest for 
the most ambiguous or complex terms, as well as the most commonplace practices). 
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absence.118  Bob Scott has also pointed out that in multilateral markets, 
economies of scale that promote standardization may also paradoxically 
amplify the stickiness of inefficient contract terms.119  These effects are 
considered more closely in Part III.C. 
There are a few additional consequences that flow out of network 
effects.  As observed by Nicholas Economides and others, markets with 
network effects will tend to experience rapid expansion, a “natural” 
monopoly among suppliers may occur (which we have already seen), path 
dependence will be strong, and traditional forms of competition may not 
cause change to the naturally occurring market structure.120  “[L]ock-in” can 
occur, as each iterative decision may “look[] optimal given past decisions, 
but is sub-optimal if earlier investment decisions had been delayed and all 
the decisions were taken at once.”121  These will be considered next. 
III. BENCHMARK DISTORTIONS 
The efficiencies achieved through dealer-mediated private ordering in 
OTC benchmark markets should not be overlooked.  But they are additionally 
notable because they have resulted from the serendipitous alignment of 
dealers’ incentives with end users’ incentives.  Financial benchmarks largely 
originated with dealers “without regulatory pressure”; even though 
benchmarks may reduce dealers’ informational advantages, increased 
liquidity and volume resulting from a benchmark can more than offset lost 
profits.122 
So long as dealers’ incentives are aligned with other market 
participants’ incentives more broadly, socially beneficial innovation—such 
as the promulgation of financial benchmarks—will tend to occur.123  But 
 
 118. See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate 
Contracting (or “the Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 729 (1997). 
 119. See Robert Scott, The Paradox of Contracting in Markets L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
(forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3561705. 
 120. See Economides, supra note 110, at 10–17. 
 121. Id. at 23 (observing that rapid technological change can exacerbate this problem with an 
oligopoly, where firms race to adopt the current best technology, failing to account for the next 
update). 
 122. Duffie, Dworczak & Zhu, supra note 11, at 3, 17 (explaining that dealers may be 
incentivized to introduce a benchmark to obtain increased volume that offsets losses due to reduced 
information advantages); Duffie & Stein, supra note 11, at 194. 
 123. This relates to a literature on “soft” governance or private regulation, which need not 
originate with legislative bodies or public rule-making institutions.  Most regulation in OTC markets 
has originated through such governance.  A particularly successful example is the growth of the 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association (“ISDA”) as a “private” regulator in derivatives 
markets.  See, e.g., Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street as Community of Fate: Toward Financial 
Industry Self-Regulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 411, 444 (2011); Rauterberg & Verstein, 
Transnational Regulation, supra note 4, at 20–24 (collecting sources).  Self-regulation has been an 
important feature of financial governance since the inception of markets, and a rich debate continues 
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while the standardizing effects of such “default” benchmarks can be 
revolutionary, they can also entrench suboptimal structures, such as faulty 
benchmarks. 
This Part identifies distortions that have arisen in these markets, 
showing that the persistence of certain benchmarks should not be taken to 
necessarily indicate their desirability.  In particular, the structures explicated 
thus far—lack of coordination mechanisms, oligopolistic domination by a 
few dealers, fantastically successful standardization of prices and referents 
through benchmarks, and deep network effects—can promote inefficient 
pooling around the “default” benchmark, even if it is suboptimal.  This Part 
discusses three main categories of distortions: (a) entrenched oligopolistic 
structures, (b) the temptation of manipulation and weakened incentives to 
monitor wrongdoing, and (c) stagnation around a suboptimal benchmark. 
A. Entrenchment of Oligopolistic Structures 
The first distortion—entrenched oligopolistic structures—arises 
because there is an outsize stickiness to the structures that have evolved—
due to network effects and complexity of markets.124  This is related to the 
literature on the first mover advantage, which can be greatly amplified when 
learning or network externalities are present.125  Indeed, economists have 
shown that in cases where substantial network effects exist, there tends to be 
dominance by one or a few suppliers of a good, creating great inequality 
between would-be competitors.126   
Here, the fact that OTC markets are dealer markets and the complexity 
of transactions in OTC markets fuel dealer concentration, which is amplified 
 
as to benefits and harms: the increased ability to leverage an industry’s expertise and added 
flexibility to respond to problems without the blunt force of government regulation must be balanced 
against potential conflicts of interest.  This very tension has spurred much of the hybrid self-
regulation that occurs in modern financial markets, whereby entities such as FINRA self-regulate 
(in the case of broker-dealers) with supplemental government oversight imposed by the SEC. 
 124. Others have observed this in broader contexts.  See generally Awrey, Private Ordering, 
supra note 75 (identifying distortions due to network externalities, path dependency, and power 
inequality in markets as a whole, and especially ones that are opaque, and noting that the success of 
certain market structures might paradoxically deter welfare-enhancing innovation). 
 125. See, e.g., Ian Domowitz, Electronic Derivatives Exchanges: Implicit Mergers, Network 
Externalities, and Standardization, 35 Q. REV. ECON. & FIN. 163, 167 (1995) (in the case of floor 
trading vs. electronic trading, noting that dominant liquidity effects and a first-mover advantage 
resulted in lock in to floor trading simply because it was cheaper and came first, a result that was 
not simply due to irrationality but due to network effects and first mover advantage); Michael L. 
Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, 8 J. ECON. PERSPS. 93, 107 (1994).  
 126. See Economides, supra note 110, at 12 (explaining that the universe of products offered by 
firms with large market shares is more valuable to consumers when network effects are present, 
creating a feedback loop that attracts even more customers (pointing to PC systems markets as an 
example), and noting that this inequality does not arise due to anticompetitive actions by any one 
firm). 
  
2020] BENCHMARK COMPETITION 29 
by dealers’ outsize influence over the price discovery functions played by 
benchmarks.  Benchmarks effectively designate the most influential dealers 
by selecting them to participate in the benchmark setting process.  One 
scholar has even argued “that the most efficient dealers can use a benchmark 
as a ‘price transparency weapon’ that drives inefficient competitors out of the 
market and draws trades to dealers in the ‘benchmark club.’”127  It makes 
sense for end users to seek out those dealers as counterparties, deeming them 
most informed, which creates a feedback loop that solidifies those dealers’ 
positional advantages not only vis-à-vis their clients, but vis-à-vis their less 
powerful competitors as well.128  Benchmarks can thus create a kind of 
bottleneck for competition. 
Relatedly, dealers may develop additional outsize influence over 
regulation.  Without alternatives, a single benchmark can become 
“systemically” important in the same way that a bank or financial institution 
can, reducing the credibility of regulatory or market discipline.129  In 2018, a 
Federal Reserve Bank committee report acknowledged as much with respect 
to LIBOR: 
Because U.S. dollar (USD) LIBOR is used in such a large volume 
and broad range of financial products and contracts, the risks 
surrounding it pose a potential threat to the safety and soundness 
of individual financial institutions and to financial stability.  
Without advanced preparation, a sudden cessation of such a 
heavily used reference rate would cause considerable disruptions 
to and uncertainties around the large gross flows of USD LIBOR-
related payments and receipts between many firms.  It would also 
impair the normal functioning of a variety of markets, including 
business and consumer lending.130 
This risk is not merely hypothetical.  Because LIBOR determines 
worldwide loan and mortgage rates, systematic underreporting of LIBOR in 
2008 resulted in artificially low payments to those banks from borrowers, 
meaning they were undercompensated for their risks, which potentially 
exacerbated the crisis.131 
 
 127. Duffie, Dworczak & Zhu, supra note 11, at 3.  
 128. See id. at 4; Glode & Opp, supra note 4, at 1.  
 129. There is a vast literature on the consequences of systemically important financial 
institutions (“SIFIs”).  See, e.g., FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY 
REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL 
AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES xviii–xix (2011).  
 130. N.Y. FED. RES., ALTERNATIVE REF. RATES COMM., SECOND REPORT OF THE 
ALTERNATIVE REFERENCE RATES COMMITTEE 1 (March 2018), 
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/Microsites/arrc/files/2018/ARRC-Second-report.  
 131. See Bainbridge, supra note 14, at 797–98 (also noting that artificially low LIBOR rates 
would have caused losses for investors).  
  
30 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 80:1 
It is not difficult to imagine how, as dealers amass expertise and become 
indispensable to the benchmark setting process, they can gain some control 
over legal and regulatory aspects of the market as well.132  Dealers are in a 
naturally superior bargaining position, not only because they are experts, but 
because they are far fewer in number and do not suffer from the collective 
action problems that end users do.133  For example, in 2000, the passage of 
the Commodities Futures Modernization Act (“CFMA”) essentially removed 
swaps and most derivatives from regulation, which some have argued 
precipitated the 2008 financial crisis.134  Powerful lobbying by the derivatives 
industry, the argument goes, stymied regulatory efforts to exercise 
jurisdiction over derivatives.135  Just as worryingly, these dealers are usually 
systemically critical institutions,136 which may skew regulators’ actions even 
more severely.137  With benchmarks, the problem has only grown.  Evidence 
has emerged that as early as the middle of 2008, regulators were informed of 
potential wrongdoing around LIBOR but took no action.  Instead, regulators 
at the Bank of England seem to have implicitly endorsed manipulation out of 
fears that doing otherwise would have further undermined global confidence 
in the banks.138  This kind of influence is only amplified as regulators and 
public bodies increasingly rely on any given benchmark and that benchmark 
becomes “systemically” important in the same way that a bank or financial 
institution can be. 
B. Benchmark Manipulation 
Manipulation is one of the most obvious distortive consequences of the 
structures laid out above.139  In financial markets, manipulation is particularly 
attractive when a small tweak will have a disproportionately large financial 
 
 132. As early as 1993, scholars were identifying the growing knowledge gap between regulators 
and industry participants.  See, e.g., Hu, supra note 32, at 1463. 
 133. See Judge, Intermediary Influence, supra note 59, at 597–98. 
 134. See, e.g., Stout, supra note 27, at 22–29.  The argument then goes that rampant speculative 
trading in derivatives outpaced legitimate hedging activity.   
 135. See Rauterberg & Verstein, Transnational Regulation, supra note 4 (arguing that ISDA’s 
expertise in standardizing swap practices led to their successful lobby to end the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission’s (“CFTC”) direct supervision of OTC derivatives through enactment of the 
CFMA). 
 136. These are usually SIFIs.  See 2018 List of Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs), 
FIN. STABILITY BD. (Nov. 16, 2018), https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P161118-1.pdf. 
 137. See Rauterberg & Verstein, Index Theory, supra note 9, at 48 (noting that punishment may 
not be credible against indices that are socially important).  
 138. See Rauterberg & Verstein, Transnational Regulation, supra note 4, at 38–39 (detailing 
documents that demonstrate potential knowledge of Bank of England and Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York officials); How Britain’s Rate-Fixing Scandal Might Spread — And What to Do About 
It, ECONOMIST (July 7, 2012), http://www.economist.com/node/21558260.   
 139. Manipulation is an age-old phenomenon.  See generally JERRY W. MARKHAM, LAW 
ENFORCEMENT AND THE HISTORY OF FINANCIAL MARKET MANIPULATION 14–16 (2014). 
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effect.140  Benchmarks have essentially hardwired just such a structural 
asymmetry into OTC markets.   
The same mechanisms through which benchmarks provided 
ingenious—and inexpensive—ways to overcome otherwise costly 
information asymmetries also provided inexpensive means of manipulation.  
First, because benchmarks are so deeply integrated into markets where 
trading notionals have grown to sizes in the trillions, a would-be manipulator 
of foreign currency rates, for example, would not need to control the global 
supply of Japanese yen; they would need only tweak the benchmark rate to 
which the worldwide exchange rates are indexed.141  A single benchmark, 
referenced throughout enormous markets, thus presents a particularly 
tempting target for manipulation.142  Second, benchmarks’ setting 
methodologies render them susceptible to influence.  Methodologies usually 
rely on a concentrated sliver of data from a narrow subset of market 
participants, aggregating massive amounts of financial data in one 
predictable, repeated calculation.143  The same dealers who are counterparties 
to most transactions that reference benchmark rates are also those either 
tasked with setting those benchmark rates or whose trades will naturally have 
greater impact on them, creating opportunities to manipulate and incentives 
to do so.144    
 
 140. See generally Anthony Lee Zhang, Competition and Manipulation in Derivative Contract 
Markets (July 28, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3413265 (developing 
a model that predicts susceptibility to manipulation).  More traditional market manipulation is 
otherwise extremely costly.  Traditionally, manipulation required obtaining enormous amounts of 
any given asset and control over a market segment.  This is not only resource-intensive, but it is 
risky.  The market could easily move against a manipulator before they have time to unwind their 
position, undoing any potential profits.  See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 9, at 1940–41; Verstein, 
Benchmark Manipulation, supra note 12, at 220–24 (discussing the difficulties of traditional market 
manipulation and its attendant transaction costs, liquidity issues, carrying costs, and general risks 
of idiosyncratic risk or illiquid markets that will reduce a manipulator’s ability to profit).  In the 
past, some academics have even dismissed the necessity of regulating manipulation and deemed it 
self-deterring due to the cost associated with successful manipulation.  See Daniel R. Fischel & 
David J. Ross, Should the Law Prohibit “Manipulation” in Financial Markets?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 
503, 512–13 (1991) (arguing, famously, that market manipulation is self-deterring for cost and 
incentive reasons); cf. Steve Thel, $850,000 in Six Minutes—The Mechanics of Securities 
Manipulation, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 219, 261 (1994). 
 141. See Fletcher, supra note 9, at 1960 (discussing how benchmark manipulation is manifestly 
not self-deterring for concerns of detection or costliness of upfront investment); Verstein, 
Benchmark Manipulation, supra note 12 at 217.  
 142. See LOUIS KAPLOW, COMPETITION POLICY AND PRICE FIXING 282 (2013) (noting an oft-
cited benchmark is a tempting manipulation target in the antitrust context). 
 143. See Verstein, Benchmark Manipulation, supra note 12, at 225 (describing how benchmark 
providers produce a single benchmark rate, and explaining that “benchmarks represent market 
prices but they are not identical with them”). 
 144. See, e.g., David Hou & David Skeie, LIBOR: Origins, Economics, Crisis, Scandal, and 
Reform, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y. STAFF REPORT NO. 667, 8 (Mar. 
2014), https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr667.pdf.  In 
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And we have seen various incarnations of manipulation play out with 
respect to benchmarks—both collusive and unilateral.  With respect to 
LIBOR, banks’ derivatives traders benefited if they could convince the 
LIBOR submitter to over- or underestimate the bank’s cost of borrowing on 
any given day in order to benefit those traders’ positions.145  This was 
successful due to the disparity between the sampling market and the vast 
derivatives market tied to LIBOR.  Hefty positions for which payments 
depended on LIBOR made minuscule distortions extremely profitable.146  For 
example, Connan Snider and Thomas Youle calculated that in a single 
quarter, a 25 basis point (0.25%) change in LIBOR could net $337 million in 
interest revenue for JPMorgan, and $936 million for Citigroup, based on their 
outstanding exposures.147  These were clearly not net zero positions.148  In 
single loan terms, one loan for $10 million by Bank of America paying 
LIBOR + 1% would net an additional $25,000 to Bank of America for a mere 
0.25% rise in LIBOR. 
Manipulation of ISDAFIX operated similarly.  If reference banks had 
swaptions expiring on some day, they could push the ISDAFIX on that day 
 
setting LIBOR, a panel of reference banks were asked, “At what rate could you borrow funds . . . in 
a reasonable market size just prior to 11 am?” and, after discarding the highest and lowest answers, 
the average of the remainders was taken.  The Basics, BBALIBOR, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20120121102345/http://www.bbalibor.com/bbalibor-explained/the-
basics (last visited  Feb. 2, 2020) (emphasis omitted).  The setting of ISDAFIX was calculated based 
on a combination of trading in the interdealer swaps market followed by submissions from eleven 
dealer banks.  See, e.g., Order Instituting Proceedings Pursuant to Sections 6(c) and 6(d) of the 
Commodity Exchange Act, Making Findings, and Imposing Remedial Sanctions at 6, 12, In re 
Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., No. 17-03 (Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n Dec. 21, 2016), 
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legal
pleading/enfgoldmansachsorder122116.pdf.  And the WM/Reuters FX rates were calculated by 
taking the median of the spot currency transactions, and only in the interdealer market, during the 
one-minute window from thirty seconds prior to 4 p.m. to thirty seconds after 4 p.m.  See FOREIGN 
EXCH. BENCHMARK GRP., FIN. STABILITY BD., FOREIGN EXCHANGE BENCHMARKS 
CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT 7 (2014), https://www.fsb.org/wp-
content/uploads/r_140715.pdf?page_moved=1.  While the susceptibility to manipulation of LIBOR 
and ISDAFIX may be obvious, it is important to point out that the transaction-based methodology 
of the WM/Reuters FX rates does not protect them from influence. “The ability to strategically feed 
or starve the transactional benchmark of transactional data gives transactors outsized influence.”  
Verstein, Benchmark Manipulation, supra note 12, at 241; see also Duffie & Stein, supra note 11, 
at 194 (noting that when a counterparty is also a benchmark setter it greatly amplifies the 
manipulation incentive). 
 145. See, e.g., Press Release No. 15-499, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 18; Press Release No. 
13-161, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 18.  
 146. Duffie & Stein, supra note 11, at 200 (observing the minuscule rate distortions in LIBOR 
manipulation cases); Rauterberg & Verstein, Index Theory, supra note 9, at 4 (citing a study 
demonstrating that a sustained 1.75% raise in the six-month LIBOR (as was the case in 2008) would 
mean additional thousands of dollars paid in interest on home mortgages a year per borrower, which 
would increase mortgage defaults when systemic risk was already a huge concern).  
 147. Snider & Youle, supra note 19, at 10. 
 148. See, e.g., Rauterberg & Verstein, Index Theory, supra note 9, at 32. 
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by trading the underlying swaps in a certain direction or submitting a higher 
or lower ISDAFIX.  That would then determine the value of the swaptions 
and enable the bank to profit illicitly.149 
In FX, the manipulation took place both unilaterally and via shared 
information—dealers shared confidential client information ahead of the 
benchmark setting time so that manipulators could trade to profit at the 
expense of their clients.150  For example, if a dealer received an order from a 
client who wished to purchase a huge number of Japanese yen at the 
WM/Reuters 4 p.m. fix price (that is, the dealer would be selling yen to the 
client at 4 p.m.),151 entering into those trades would likely have some effect 
on the exchange rate.  However, if that dealer shared this intended trade with 
the other big players in advance of the trade so as to coordinate activity, then 
that dealer might be able to buy the necessary yen in ways so as to push the 
4 p.m. WM/Reuters rate up, and end up selling that yen to its customer at an 
artificially high rate.  Dealers also engaged in front running (trading for their 
own accounts ahead of filling customers’ orders), which was so ubiquitous 
that some commentators have likened it to a mere cost of doing business.152 
The widespread hardwiring of benchmarks also dilutes the threat of 
enforcement.  It is almost impossible to measure damages or profits as a result 
of such schemes,153 and it may simply be unrealistic to disgorge illicit profits 
 
 149. See, e.g., Press Release No. 7180-15, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC 
Orders Barclays to Pay $115 Million Penalty for Attempted Manipulation of and False Reporting 
of U.S. Dollar ISDAFIX Benchmark Swap Rates (May 20, 2015), 
https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/7180-15; Press Release No. 7371-16, U.S. 
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC Orders Citibank to Pay $250 Million for Attempted 
Manipulation and False Reporting of U.S. Dollar ISDAFIX Benchmark Swap Rates (May 25, 
2016), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/7371-16; Press Release No. 7505-16, U.S. 
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC Orders Goldman Sachs to Pay $120 Million Penalty 
for Attempted Manipulation of and False Reporting of U.S. Dollar ISDAFIX Benchmark Swap 
Rates (Dec. 21, 2016), https://cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/7505-16. 
 150. See Press Release No. 7065-14, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC Orders 
Five Banks to Pay over $1.4 Billion in Penalties for Attempted Manipulation of Foreign Exchange 
Benchmark Rates (Nov. 12, 2014), https://cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/7056-14; Press 
Release No. 15-643, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Five Major Banks Agree to Parent-Level Guilty Pleas 
(May 20, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/five-major-banks-agree-parent-level-guilty-
pleas#:~:text=Five%20major%20banks%20%E2%80%93%20Citicorp%2C%20JPMorgan,plead
%20guilty%20to%20felony%20charges. 
 151. In the FX market, if a customer places an order with, say, Citibank at 3:30 p.m. to purchase 
two billion yen at the 4 p.m. fix, Citi will purchase the two billion and then sell them to the 
counterparty at the 4 p.m. fixing price.  See, e.g., Matt Levine, Banks Manipulated Foreign 
Exchange in Ways You Can’t Teach, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 12, 2014), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2014-11-12/banks-manipulated-foreign-exchange-
in-ways-you-can-t-teach [hereinafter Levine, Banks Manipulated Foreign Exchange].   
 152. See Duffie & Stein, supra note 11, at 195 n.2.  
 153. This is especially true given that in cases such as LIBOR, damages models will need to 
ascertain the counterfactual or “true” cost of borrowing that ought to have been reported instead.  
Moreover, in all these cases, determining how and when gains might have offset losses will be 
  
34 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 80:1 
(the “too big to litigate” problem).154  Any downside to manipulation may 
also be deemed remote because of confused applicability of legal regimes.155  
Thus far, regulators and civil plaintiffs involved in benchmark-related actions 
have relied on, varyingly, the Sherman Antitrust Act,156 the Commodity 
Exchange Act,157 state antitrust laws, tort, contract, fraud, unfair business 
practice laws,158 federal and state securities laws,159 and even the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”).160  Applicability of any or all 
such regimes has been far from obvious.  Federal district courts have 
disagreed widely on whether the benchmark setting process was a 
competitive one, whether a benchmark constitutes a “price,” and whether 
“antitrust injury” under the antitrust laws can result.161  These uncertainties 
do little to foster optimal deterrence levels and instead can result in both over- 
and under-deterrence.162  The applicability of such legal regimes is discussed 
further in Part IV.A. 
 
additionally difficult.  See, e.g., James Kavanagh & Reinder Van Dijk, LIBOR Damages: Key 
Emerging Issues, INT’L COMPARATIVE LEGAL GUIDES (Oct. 17, 2012), http://www.cdr-
news.com/categories/expert-views/libor-damages:-key-emerging-issues. 
 154. Rauterberg & Verstein, Transnational Regulation, supra note 4, at 40–41.  This is 
exacerbated by the fact that benchmark setters are usually SIFIs.  Id. 
 155. For example, a traditional understanding of antitrust activity focuses on output: restricting 
output or flooding the market with output, to affect supply, demand, and prices in relatively clear 
ways.  See, e.g., Price Fixing, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-
guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/dealings-competitors/price-fixing (last visited Feb. 2, 2020).  But 
measuring alleged antitrust activity around LIBOR or FX by looking at “output” is difficult: what 
is the “output,” what is supplied, what is demanded, what is the price? 
 156. See Gelboim v. Bank of Am. Corp., 823 F.3d 759, 770–71 (2d Cir. 2016); Alaska Elec. 
Pension Fund v. Bank of Am. Corp., 175 F. Supp. 3d 44, 53–54 (S.D.N.Y. 2016); In re Foreign 
Exch. Benchmark Rates Antitrust Litig., 74 F. Supp. 3d 581, 590–91 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); Press Release 
No. 15-643, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 150. 
 157. See Press Release No. 7794-18, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC Orders 
Bank of America, N.A. to Pay $30 Million Penalty for Attempted Manipulation and False Reporting 
of U.S. Dollar ISDAFIX Benchmark Swap Rates (Sept. 19, 2018), 
https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases?7794-18. 
 158. See Alaska Elec. Pension Fund, 175 F. Supp. 3d at 49; In re Foreign Exch. Benchmark, 74 
F. Supp. 3d at 585–86; In re Libor-Based Fin. Instruments Antitrust Litig., 935 F. Supp. 2d 666, 
677 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 159. See In re LIBOR-Based Fin. Instruments, 935 F. Supp. 2d at 677 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 160. See Allen v. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC, 895 F.3d 214, 217 (2d Cir. 2018). 
 161. See Gelboim v. Bank of Am. Corp., 823 F.3d 759, 771–77 (2d Cir. 2016) (“In urging 
otherwise, the Banks argue that LIBOR is not itself a price, as it is not itself bought or sold by 
anyone.  The point is immaterial.  LIBOR forms a component of the return from various LIBOR-
denominated financial instruments, and the fixing of a component of price violates the antitrust 
laws.”). 
 162. For example, some banks have attempted to withdraw from LIBOR setting.  David Enrich, 
Banks Warned Not to Leave LIBOR: U.K. Regulator Seeks to Protect Benchmark Rate as Lenders 
Threaten to Quit Panel After Scandal, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 13 2013), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324432004578302164058534372.  Optimal 
deterrence more broadly depends on forcing wrongdoers to internalize the costs of their misconduct.  
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Finally, the lack of sufficient incentives for benchmark providers to 
properly monitor the benchmark setting process exacerbates these 
weaknesses.  As Gabriel Rauterberg and Andrew Verstein have pointed out, 
benchmarks are byproducts of their providers’ businesses, which may result 
in both underproduction and malproduction of those benchmarks if their 
providers cannot fully capture gains from their promulgation.163  Markets that 
are already difficult to monitor due to their opacity—and because the actual 
misconduct is difficult to detect, as a small tweak to a benchmark value that 
causes outsize harm might otherwise fall within some band of ordinary 
fluctuation164—then also lack monitors that are adequately incentivized, 
overall decreasing the perceived threat of enforcement and lowering its 
effectiveness as a deterrence mechanism. 
C. Suboptimal Stagnation  
The two distortive effects discussed thus far—entrenchment of 
oligopolistic structures and incentives to manipulate—relate to a third effect, 
and one that has received very little scholarly or regulatory attention.165  A 
benchmark can itself be inefficient, yet markets might substitute towards it 
anyway simply due to its widespread use.  Dealer-promulgated benchmarks 
that benefit from network effects and path dependencies can promote 
inefficient pooling around the “default” benchmark, even if it is suboptimal.  
And this is precisely more likely to occur when the markets throughout which 
benchmarks are so deeply integrated depend so heavily on harmonization—
when network effects are strong.166  Thus, the persistence of certain 
benchmarks should not be taken necessarily to indicate their desirability.  It 
may be tempting to look at OTC markets and conclude that the results of 
private orders within them are indicative of optimal or efficient outcomes, 
but doing so would be a mistake.  A useful analogy here may be the 
 
Uncertainty in measuring those costs due to imprecision in the law and accompanying enforcement 
do little to optimize ex ante assessments of the cost of wrongdoing. 
 163. See Rauterberg & Verstein, Index Theory, supra note 9, at 25–26, 36–42. 
 164. See id. at 45 (observing the difficulty in both detection and proof: the huge scale of the 
markets means that a minuscule deviation—one that might seem within the normal band of price 
fluctuation—in the benchmark value could result in enormous profits). 
 165. There has been some attention paid to this phenomenon in the corporate context.  See 
Klausner, supra note 113, at 789 (observing that network externalities may render the equilibrium 
competitively reached suboptimal, and classifying the result into four types: an equilibrium with 
many products where one would be optimal, an equilibrium with one or too few products, an 
equilibrium adopting the wrong product, or an equilibrium that “lock[s] out” beneficial innovation). 
 166. See Rauterberg & Verstein, Transnational Regulation, supra note 4, at 26 n.101 (noting 
that network power might be particularly concerning where markets place great value on 
harmonization).  See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An 
Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REV. 261 
(1985) (providing classic explications of standardization contracts); Kahan & Klausner, supra note 
118. 
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persistence of the QWERTY layout for keyboards, developed in 1868, which 
due to network effects and first-mover stickiness still endures today, over 150 
years later.167 
In benchmark markets, suboptimal stagnation can occur for reasons both 
to do with users’ transaction choices and promulgators’ lack of incentives to 
introduce alternative benchmarks or update benchmark methodology in 
response to changing market conditions.  First, the perceived price 
transparency benefits of a benchmark might outweigh lack of fit with an 
institution’s transactional needs, such that, for example, market participants 
may choose to transact at the 4 p.m. WM/Reuters FX rates even if transacting 
at some other time would be more optimal.168  This may also occur due to the 
liquidity benefits offered by that benchmark, as high trading volume often 
garners faster execution, lower prices, and less onerous search.169  These 
liquidity benefits will draw parties away from less-actively traded 
products.170  The “basin of attraction [of a benchmark] can thus become larger 
and larger, given the positive feedback effects of informational transparency 
and liquidity.”171 
In addition, entire ecosystems of additional products can sprout up 
around a particularly successful benchmark, in large part due to the network 
effects previously discussed.172  As a benchmark becomes more commonly 
referenced, additional products will tend to incorporate that benchmark, and 
standardization throughout the product ecosystem will attract additional use 
by market participants.  LIBOR’s established dominance in the 1980s led to 
the introduction of many LIBOR-based hedging instruments, which only 
amplified the “magnetic qualities of LIBOR-based trading.”173  
These effects may dominate and cause extra stickiness of a benchmark, 
even if the market is aware of its potential for manipulation.  The switching 
 
 167. See Di Noia, supra note 112, at 9; Rauterberg & Verstein, Index Theory, supra note 9, at 
43 (observing that network effects with indices mean that a single index will likely dominate); Craig 
Pirrong, Bund for Glory, or It’s a Long Way to Tip a Market 3 (Feb. 23, 2005) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=672504 (with respect to liquidity 
providers facing adverse selection, noting that they will tend to congregate on a single exchange in 
order to minimize transaction costs, i.e., that markets are “tippy”). 
 168. See, e.g., Duffie & Stein, supra note 11, at 195. 
 169. See id. 
 170. See id. 
 171. Id. at 196; see also Ian W. Marsh, Panagiotis Panagiotou & Richard Payne, The WMR Fix 
and its Impact on Currency Markets, NORGES BANK 6 (Sept. 29, 2017), https://www.norges-
bank.no/contentassets/619c8b75e1ed4ba691e8ad6a006855e6/39-panagiotou—-the-wmr-fix-and-
its-impact-on-currency-markets-.pdf. 
 172. See supra Part II.B.4. 
 173. Duffie & Stein, supra note 11, at 196.  Innovation can also be driven by supply 
characteristics, rather than demand.  See generally, e.g., Dan Awrey, Toward a Supply-Side Theory 
of Financial Innovation, 41 J. COMPARATIVE ECON. 401 (2013).  
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costs become enormous, a direct result of the very aspect that made 
benchmarks so successful: their widespread adoption and use.174  Some 
market participants may even choose not to switch, despite understanding the 
susceptibility of benchmarks to manipulation.175  Powerful dealers can then 
take advantage of a benchmark’s weaknesses without fear of market 
discipline.  One need only look at the status of reforms for financial 
benchmarks to understand the magnitude of the problem.  As the President 
of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York stated in a recent speech, 
“[c]ontracts that reference U.S. dollar LIBOR continue to be written, which 
only serves to increase the level of systemic risk.”176  Switch has only begun 
to come about because the government has mandated such, and doing so has 
proven so complicated that the largest, most sophisticated dealers and their 
law firms have devoted huge resources to managing the process.177 
As network effects proliferate and the same benchmarks are used over 
and over again, the likelihood of competition in the form of other benchmarks 
or referents becomes vanishingly small.  Not only will a dominant benchmark 
provider lack adequate incentive to promulgate additional benchmarks, it 
might also fail to invest in improvements to the existing benchmark.178  For 
example, LIBOR was reported for multiple currencies and multiple tenors 
(term periods) for years.179  Certain combinations were extremely thinly 
traded, and bankers often fabricated estimates when surveyed.180  This was 
not (always) due to the attempt to manipulate, but simply due to lack of 
underlying data.  And yet, perhaps because of LIBOR’s dominance, no 
participant thought it worthwhile to consider alternative reporting 
mechanisms.  And why would they?  No financial benefit would have come 
of the added effort.  Rauterberg and Verstein have argued that the fact that 
most benchmarks were created as byproducts of their providers’ businesses 
reduces these incentives even further, as does the fact that these benchmark 
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providers currently do not charge for use of their benchmarks, an issue 
explored further in Part IV.C.181 
Overall, this means that even if users would prefer to switch away from 
the most widely used benchmark, the lack of viable alternatives effectively 
locks them into the single existing benchmark, even if it is faulty or outdated.  
This can also help explain, for example, why no “tamper-proof” benchmark 
evolved on its own—the choice to promulgate any additional benchmark will 
be distorted by the tradeoff between the immediate benefits conferred by 
using an established, if suboptimal benchmark, and the benefits of an 
alternative benchmark with uncertain, possibly non-existent, network 
benefits and even potential costs.182  As previously alluded to, markets with 
network effects can see substantial path dependence, and as more and more 
transactions reference a few benchmarks, “lock-in” can easily occur, as each 
iterative decision may “look[] optimal given past decisions, but is sub-
optimal if earlier investment decisions had been delayed and all the decisions 
were taken at once.”183  It becomes difficult, and a risky financial endeavor, 
to “coordinat[e] the simultaneous defection of large numbers of” market 
participants.184 
D. “Default” Benchmarks 
At this point, it is useful to address the potential counterargument that 
rents resulting from the structures described above are costs that the market 
is willing to tolerate in return for the flexibility provided by OTC markets, 
and that sophisticated entities have determined the extant structures to be the 
most efficient for their purposes.  This argument would follow from the 
dominant paradigm in law and economics, which assumes that agents engage 
in welfare-maximizing behavior with one another, without significant effects 
on third parties, reaching optimal contractual arrangements that lower the 
cost of transacting or attaining equilibria that are overall socially optimal 
given achievable alternatives.185  Indeed, this view prevailed for much of the 
history of OTC market (de)regulation.  Regulators viewed market 
participants as “sophisticated and informed,” and as such, best positioned to 
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assess risks and rewards in financial transactions, with a dealer market 
perceived as “highly efficient” in hedging risk, among other activities.186  As 
a result, regulators have historically deferred to the consequent transactional 
arrangements seen in OTC markets.  
But this model does not capture the whole story.  Importantly, there is a 
countervailing phenomenon, and one that scholars such as Klausner, 
Economides, and Ian Domowitz have pointed out in the contracting, 
products, and trading contexts: assuming that observed equilibria are the 
most optimal ones is not always prudent, and less so when network effects 
exert strong pulls.187  In a similar vein, Scott has pointed out that in 
multilateral markets, the very “factors that generate efficiencies in the 
production of contracts—standardization and economies of scale—are the 
same factors that produce inefficiencies in the very contract terms that parties 
rely on to motivate performance.”188 
In other words, simply because OTC markets have historically been 
dominated by private ordering does not necessarily mean that the results of 
such private orders are indicative of optimal or efficient outcomes, and the 
persistence or dominance of certain benchmarks should not be taken to 
necessarily indicate their desirability.  
Instead, as we have seen, benchmark-dominated markets tend to 
promote network formation, which can lock in potentially distortive or 
suboptimal structures.  Moreover, the pull of network effects and existing 
power structures will likely deter any single actor from acting differently.  
While an institution such as Delta is certainly not powerless or 
unsophisticated, its informational capabilities (at least vis-à-vis a dealer such 
as Goldman Sachs) and ability to coordinate with other end users is limited, 
creating collective action issues.  Nor are there currently sufficient incentives 
for additional benchmarks or providers to enter the market or improve 
existing benchmarks.  This is explored more fully in the next Part. 
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IV. IMPLICATIONS AND REFORM 
The above discussion illustrates in detail how certain structures in 
benchmark markets and accompanying path dependencies can encourage 
inefficient lock-in and facilitate wrongdoing, and why such effects are 
especially potent when markets are otherwise opaque, decentralized, and 
dominated by a few powerful players.  “Systemically” important benchmarks 
may result; incentives to monitor wrongdoing can weaken; and so long as a 
benchmark remains so entrenched in an ecosystem dominated by powerful 
institutions, there is little likelihood of innovation or competition from 
socially beneficial alternative benchmarks, and market-based discipline will 
remain ineffective. 
This Part interrogates the optimal “default” benchmark structures in 
OTC markets.  In addition to the enforcement or governance-based reforms 
proposed by others, which overwhelmingly assume that a single benchmark 
will continue to dominate, this Part advocates for a more fundamental 
approach, and proposes an alternative competitive equilibrium—one where 
multiple benchmarks compete. 
To be clear, this Article does not advocate wholesale restructuring of 
OTC markets.  There are, as set out above, defensible reasons for the 
dominance of large dealers.  Their cost of providing liquidity in bespoke, 
decentralized markets remains far lower than that of end users and, for the 
most part, end users benefit from dealers’ expertise and the ease with which 
they are able to take on and hedge risks.  The inquiry focuses instead on the 
distortions caused by the dominance of certain benchmark rates as they 
interact with OTC market structures, and the implications for credible private 
market discipline.  It is unrealistic to expect counterparties to credibly 
demand better behavior from dealers.  As discussed above, counterparties are 
diffuse, suffer from coordination problems, and usually make use of OTC 
markets for discrete transactions or for discrete business needs.  It is also 
risky to continue relying on the incentives of dealers, as doing so is sensible 
only so long as those dealers’ incentives are aligned with the markets’ as a 
whole. 
Instead, with the understanding that benchmark weaknesses began with 
the basic market forces that gave rise to benchmark development, the above 
insights help illuminate an important avenue for reform: the expansion of 
benchmark choices.  This would, I argue, better align private incentives with 
more socially optimal outcomes.  In considering this proposal, this Part first 
considers other existing reform proposals.  Second, it explores the benefits to 
benchmark competition.  Finally, it discusses mechanisms for transition. 
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A. Existing Benchmark Alternatives 
Existing benchmark reform proposals overwhelmingly contemplate that 
a single benchmark rate will continue to dominate.  Before addressing this 
Article’s main proposal, to increase the number of benchmarks, it is worth 
reviewing the existing proposals.  As discussed below, these largely fall into 
three buckets—refining the calculation methodology of existing benchmarks, 
relying on enforcement and compliance to improve benchmark governance, 
and turning to the government to provide and oversee benchmarks. 
The first category, which focuses on calculation methodology reform, 
is a worthy endeavor.  The majority of such proposals advocate enlarging 
sampling windows or randomizing samples, such as by widening the window 
during which transactions may affect a benchmark setting, as in the case of 
the WM/Reuters FX benchmark rates, or turning to a transactions-based 
methodology and eliminating submission components of a benchmark, as 
with the ICE swap rate.189  Any of these reforms would almost certainly 
reduce a benchmark’s susceptibility to manipulation, but they are not without 
their own costs.  Studies have shown that, for example, widening the 
sampling window for the WM/Reuters FX benchmark calculation has 
introduced tracking error and potentially lowered the utility of such a rate to 
end users.190  Moreover, total immunity to manipulation is impossible, and 
attempting to achieve it would be exceedingly costly.  Expecting that current 
benchmark administrators bear such costs runs into the same incentive 
problems discussed in this Article.191   
Enforcement and compliance will no doubt remain an important part of 
discipline.  However, the patchwork applicability of fraud, manipulation, 
antitrust regimes, and difficulty or impossibility of measuring harm or 
disgorging profits, as alluded to in Part III.B, pose a significant obstacle to 
either ex ante deterrence or ex post discipline.192  There have been some 
excellent proposals to address this and refine ex post governance.  Verstein 
has proposed that benchmarks be protected as price reports under the 
Commodity Exchange Act,193 Gregory Scopino has argued for an expansion 
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of the Commodity Exchange Act’s antitrust reach,194 and Rosa M. Abrantes-
Metz, Rauterberg and Verstein advocate for the use of empirical tools such 
as manipulation screens in pleading.195  Gina-Gail S. Fletcher has proposed a 
framework modeled on self-regulatory organizations, where a non-
governmental organization would have disciplinary authority over 
members—benchmark administrators and data contributors—with 
regulatory oversight from either the United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) or the CFTC.196  While these proposals certainly merit 
consideration, a closer look reveals that the confusion runs deeper.   
For one, and as recognized by other scholars, the legal frameworks that 
exist—fraud, antitrust, and manipulation—are both over- and under-
inclusive.197  With respect to fraud, the workhorse elements—material 
misstatement or omission, intent, reliance and harm—are difficult to 
prove.198  Enforcement under the securities laws has all but collapsed the 
concept of manipulation into that of fraud.199  Antitrust laws demand an 
injury to the forces of competition itself.200  Were dealers in a competitive 
process?  Interestingly, civil plaintiffs and the CFTC had diametrically 
opposing theories of wrongdoing in the ISDAFIX cases.  Plaintiffs alleged 
an antitrust conspiracy, while the CFTC fined dealers for unilateral 
manipulation.201  Finally, stand-alone manipulation—poorly defined in 
regulation and statute—includes an intent element that is almost comically 
difficult to prove.202  Outstanding questions abound.  If a transaction is 
motivated at least in part by a legitimate reason, can it ever be manipulative?  
Does manipulation require deceit?  Is an artificial price required?  What 
constitutes an artificial price?  These questions plague scholars, courts, and 
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regulators—and will continue to do so as long as these frameworks are not 
updated to reflect current market practices.  Indeed, the European General 
Court recently overturned a 33.6 million euro fine imposed against HSBC by 
the European Commission, stating that the regulator provided “insufficient 
reasoning” for the fine.203   
The confusion across legal regimes has been echoed in the defenses 
proffered by traders and banks, who routinely plead that they did not think 
they were acting inappropriately.204  Indeed, some forms of manipulation, 
such as that concerning the WM/Reuters FX benchmark, could plausibly be 
cast as pre-trade hedging.205  And there is certainly sympathy in the law for 
trading activity that comprises legitimate hedging activity.206  Regardless of 
the ultimate credibility of such defenses, that they are put forth at all helps 
highlight larger difficulties of policing “new” forms of financial wrongdoing.  
Relying solely on compliance levers within a firm and adjusting them after 
wrongdoing comes to light will always be reactive, and often miss some 
category of misconduct.  Compliance is most effective when the conduct is 
clearly prohibited ex ante. 
Nor do such proposals address the problem of regulatory capture due to 
the systemic importance of a benchmark, as occurred with LIBOR in 2008.  
A failure of governance due to the overwhelming importance of a single 
aspect of the financial system cannot be solved simply by tweaking legal 
frameworks. 
Relying on the government as a benchmark provider (similar to utility 
provision) is also problematic, and likely to be slow, cumbersome, and costly.  
Nor is there any guarantee the government will get it “right.”  As a specific 
example, let us consider the slow path to reforming LIBOR.  A decade after 
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the actual manipulation, the U.S., the U.K., Europe, Japan, and Switzerland 
have only just begun to creakily transition to a designated alternative.207  
These alternatives are not scheduled to fully replace their country’s Interbank 
Offered Rate (“IBOR”) until 2021 at the earliest, when the BBA is expected 
to cease production of LIBOR.208  In the U.S., regulators have settled on the 
Secured Overnight Financing Rate (“SOFR”), a measurement of banks’ 
overnight borrowing rate (secured by Treasury securities), as the sole 
designated LIBOR replacement.209  LIBOR had flaws, to be sure.  But so too 
does SOFR: the markets for SOFR can be finicky and overly sensitive to 
funding market idiosyncrasies, such as the due date for corporate taxes, 
Treasury securities entering the market for unrelated reasons, and the level 
of a bank’s reserves.  For example, on September 17, 2019, SOFR jumped 
three percentage points in a single day, a huge amount for an index rate, 
simply because corporate investors’ tax obligations coincided with a large 
net Treasury issuance.210 
Nor should SOFR, a secured overnight rate based on repurchase 
agreement transactions, be viewed as a perfect, or necessarily even close, 
substitute for LIBOR, a credit-sensitive term rate.  Importantly, SOFR is 
backward-looking, while LIBOR is forward-looking by embedding banks’ 
estimations of their borrowing costs, which are inherently future-oriented.211  
For many borrowers, interest rates pegged to future economic movements 
will be much more useful than those that lag the market.212  These differences 
mean that, should market participants in fact fully transition to SOFR, they 
will need to understand and calculate multiple, dynamic mathematical 
relationships between the two rates for many contracts with payment 
obligations extending far into the future.213  Any issues will be exacerbated 
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because the main players in OTC markets—banks—are better off when they 
can match their lending revenue with their borrowing costs.  LIBOR, which 
measures precisely banks’ cost of borrowing from each other, was actually 
an excellent rate at which to lend: banks’ revenue from loans given out at 
LIBOR would match their cost of borrowing from each other, allowing a 
match between assets and liabilities.214  Thus, “if a bank wants to sell an 
adjustable rate mortgage, defining its cost as a spread over LIBOR allows it 
to minimize its basis risk between the rate it charges the consumer and the 
cost of the bank’s funds.”215  The introduction of SOFR will create basis risk 
between a bank’s borrowing costs and its lending revenue (now tied to 
SOFR).216  It is not a stretch to imagine that any additional risks will be passed 
on to end users (for example, Delta and its customers) in the form of higher 
costs.  These uncertainties will create additional risk for financial 
transactions—risk that the government is likely ill-equipped to advise on or 
manage.217  Moreover, in a crisis, a rate such as LIBOR has proven a much 
better measure of cost of borrowing than a risk-free rate, a concern that some 
banks specifically flagged to regulators in 2019.218  The impact of COVID-
19 illustrates this: LIBOR and SOFR diverged substantially in value, as the 
two benchmarks responded to very different market stimuli.219  If banks’ 
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funding costs were high while their lending revenue remained low, they 
would be exposed to enormous basis risk.220 
Not only may the government suffer from lack of expertise,221 it will 
always have its own agenda.222  The SOFR example also illustrates that the 
story is not one simply about conflicts of interest.  If it were, simply divorcing 
the benchmark providers from dealers who are counterparties to indexed 
transactions would seem an obvious solution.  But as this Article has shown, 
there are legitimate reasons to keep dealers involved in both benchmark 
setting and as counterparties to indexed transactions—not least because of 
market efficiencies produced through their information and expertise.223  
Doing so, as pointed out by others, would also likely result in 
underproduction of benchmarks.224  Nor would such a proscription 
adequately address issues such as suboptimality or a systemically important 
benchmark. 
Thus, we have, again, a benchmark that is likely suboptimal, where 
markets, again, have no real alternative.  To wit, regulators continue to issue 
COVID-19 loans with timelines extending years into the future tied not to 
SOFR, but to LIBOR.225 
Nor is it clear that SOFR would be immune to manipulation (a 
transactions-based index is by itself certainly no guarantee of integrity, as the 
WM/Reuters foreign exchange manipulation has taught us).  Instead, why not 
have a LIBOR-like rate and SOFR?  Eighty percent of market participants 
surveyed in 2017 in fact preferred that LIBOR remain.226 
 
 220. See Burnett, supra note 218; Marcus Burnett, For Businesses Libor Transition Efforts Must 
Move Ahead, SOFR ACADEMY (Apr. 18, 2020), https://sofracademy.com/for-businesses-libor-
transition-efforts-must-move-ahead/. 
 221. See, e.g., Farrell & Klemperer, supra note 174, at 93 (concluding governments are best 
suited to provide standards in industries without rapid innovation, such as driving, currency, weights 
and measures and so on, but cautioning against government standards in cases where competing 
standards are unclear, the government may lack expertise, or where the industry is rapidly evolving). 
 222. See, e.g., Rauterberg & Verstein, Index Theory, supra note 9, at 38 (noting that “many 
market participants flocked to Libor precisely to avoid government-controlled indices”) (citing 
Michael Carsella, The LIBOR Controversy Part II: Focusing Attention on Basis Risk and Loan 
Profitability, SECURED LENDER, May/June 2010, at 44, 45, 
http://www.thesecuredlenderdigital.com/thesecuredlender/20100506#pg46. 
 223. Abrantes-Metz and Evans also recognize this in noting that by placing lawyers and 
compliance officers in charge of setting LIBOR, the Wheatley recommendations substantially 
reduce LIBOR’s flexibility and representativeness in response to changing market conditions.  
Abrantes-Metz & Evans, supra note 215, at 6.   
 224. See Rauterberg & Verstein, Index Theory, supra note 9, at 49.  
 225. See Libor Goes from Dying to in Demand with Fed Pushing Fast Loans, AM. BANKER (May 
6, 2020), https://www.americanbanker.com/articles/libor-goes-from-dying-to-in-demand-with-fed-
pushing-fast-loans. 
 226. See, e.g., Schrimpf & Sushko, supra note 211, at 47.  
  
2020] BENCHMARK COMPETITION 47 
The point is not one about SOFR’s suitability as a replacement for 
LIBOR (although that is certainly in question).227  SOFR may be better suited 
for certain transactions.228  Instead, the point is to illustrate that a one-size-
fits-all benchmark is not a realistic goal—and staying within that paradigm 
will likely only replicate existing problems or result in unanticipated and 
unnecessary cost and risk to the financial system.  While reform to calculation 
methodology can certainly make it more difficult to manipulate benchmarks, 
doing so only targets one aspect of the problem.  Compliance-based systems 
risk failing to anticipate wrongdoing before the fact.  Existing legal 
frameworks are plainly insufficient.  Reliance solely on enforcement is also 
unlikely to be sufficient, for reasons made clear by the capture of regulators 
in 2008 regarding LIBOR manipulation.  Nor would a prohibition on 
benchmark provision by the same entities who are counterparties to 
transactions referencing those benchmarks make sense—doing so would 
likely reduce incentives to participate in a benchmark setting so severely that 
benchmarks would simply disappear.  Government provision of benchmarks 
is likely to be slow, costly, and cumbersome.  The pathologies identified in 
this Article are deeper and begin with OTC market structures and incentives 
themselves.  The next Part discusses the potential significant benefits to 
having more than one benchmark.  
B. Benefits to Competition 
Competition can have significant benefits for participants market-wide 
and increase efficiency, by incentivizing socially beneficial innovation, 
fostering transparency and better information, and encouraging entry by more 
efficient providers.229  With respect to OTC benchmark markets in particular, 
even if dealers remain dominant due to natural accumulation of expertise, 
additional benchmarks can lead to benchmarks that are more tailored, 
nimbler, less systemically important, and less tempting and more difficult to 
manipulate. 
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First, the addition of benchmarks would cut down on the number of 
transactions tied to any given benchmark.  This could reduce incentives to 
manipulate by lowering the potential upside to doing so.  For example, two 
interest rate benchmarks might halve the potential gains to Citibank and 
JPMorgan from a 25 basis point (0.25%) change in LIBOR discussed in Part 
III.B.  So long as a single benchmark dominates huge market segments, there 
will be a significant incentive to manipulate.230  This is, of course, assuming 
that additional benchmarks could be created that are more resilient to 
manipulation in calculation methods.  Similarly, to the extent there are fixed 
costs to wrongdoing, increasing the number of benchmarks might increase 
the overall costs of cheating and make it less attractive.  This would be 
especially true for transaction-based benchmarks, a feature that dominates 
proposed or ongoing benchmark reforms already.  Let us assume that there 
are costs to manipulating a single benchmark, for example, the WM/Reuters 
FX rate.  If a dealer preferred that the 4 p.m. benchmark set at an artificially 
high rate, so that the dealer could sell some currency to its customer at an 
inflated rate, the dealer would (simplistically speaking) need to purchase a 
sufficient quantity of currency in the small window of time leading up to 4 
p.m.231  This is risky and requires resources and effort.  If other dealers are in 
the market engaging in trades that will tend to move the rate in the opposite 
direction, the manipulating dealer will need to exert even more effort to see 
their manipulation through.  So long as the potential benefits to manipulation 
outweigh these costs, however, manipulation will remain tempting.232  If 
multiple benchmarks existed and manipulating each additional benchmark 
required the same level of effort or risk, the potential costs might quickly 
outweigh the benefits (especially if there were fewer transactions tied to a 
single benchmark, and a consequent reduction in potential gain from a single 
manipulation).  And, beyond the costs to engaging in the mechanics of 
manipulation, there may be reputation costs, personnel costs, and so forth.  
Thus, if multiple benchmarks co-existed, manipulation might become less 
attractive ex ante. 
Second, additional benchmarks might make market discipline more 
effective by lowering the cost of switching for end users.  Currently, market 
participants are stuck with a single benchmark, even if that benchmark is 
faulty, prone to manipulation, or known to be manipulated.  For example, its 
awareness of LIBOR’s manipulation did not stop the U.S. Treasury from 
 
 230. Duffie & Stein, supra note 11, at 211. 
 231. See, e.g., Levine, Banks Manipulated Foreign Exchange’, supra note 151.   
 232. See, e.g., Brian Coulter, Joel Shapiro & Peter Zimmerman, A Mechanism for LIBOR, HARV. 
L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Oct. 29, 2017), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/10/29/a-mechanism-for-libor/. 
  
2020] BENCHMARK COMPETITION 49 
issuing TARP loans indexed to LIBOR during the financial crisis.233  Nor is 
it stopping regulators from issuing COVID-19-related loans linked to LIBOR 
today.234  Contrast this with the equities markets, where indices operate in a 
multiple-benchmark competitive equilibrium that allows investors and 
institutions to select the index that best fits their needs, switching away from 
suboptimal benchmarks as prudent.  For example, the S&P 500, the Dow 
Jones, NASDAQ, Russell 2000 all serve to provide varying but similar 
measures of the stock markets’ performance.  If the Dow Jones were 
compromised, alternatives exist that make the prospect of opting out of 
referencing the Dow Jones more realistic and comparatively much less 
costly.  This also illustrates a related point about comparability between 
benchmarks: while this Article advocates for benchmarks that are more 
tailored, this would not necessarily come at the cost of comparability between 
benchmarks, as illustrated both by the coexistence of multiple equities 
indices as well as comparisons drawn between LIBOR and SOFR as 
discussed in the previous Part. 
Similarly, additional benchmarks and consequently less widespread 
hardwiring of a single benchmark could reduce a benchmark’s systemic 
impact and loosen powerful dealers’ influence over regulatory behavior.  
Multiple benchmarks, simply because each one would be less widely 
referenced, could reduce the systemic risk posed by any single benchmark.  
And, if a single benchmark became compromised, regulators may be less 
hesitant to publicly discipline those responsible when there are others whose 
integrity remains intact.  In other words, a situation such as the one in 2008, 
where Bank of England regulators appear to have implicitly blessed LIBOR 
manipulation for fear of undermining confidence in the banks, could be 
avoided.  One could also hypothesize that such pathologies might not infect 
stock indices.  If the S&P 500 were compromised, markets would 
conceivably understand to discount its numbers and much more easily look 
toward another index as a reference; or if production of the Dow Jones 
ceased, the likelihood of systemic market risk ensuing would be far lower. 
Additional benchmarks could also reduce the tendency towards 
suboptimal standardization.  As noted above, there is emerging evidence that 
a single dominant benchmark is not always optimal.  To return to the LIBOR 
example, it is not clear that LIBOR is itself necessarily the most desirable 
benchmark in some cases.235  Darrell Duffie and Jeremy Stein have pointed 
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out the suboptimal nature of LIBOR as a reference rate used across the 
entirety of the interest rate derivatives market.236  They have posited that, “if 
we could start the world from scratch, we would aim for a two-rate model, 
with a transactions-based LIBOR+ serving as the reference rate for most on-
balance-sheet bank lending contracts, and with some low-credit-risk 
reference rate . . . serving as the reference rate for the majority of interest-
rate derivatives.”237  Similarly, in identifying suboptimal aspects of LIBOR, 
Rebecca Tabb and Joseph Grundfest have observed some shift away from 
unsecured interbank lending in markets more broadly, and that an 
environment comprising several benchmarks co-existing with LIBOR may 
be more optimal: “it makes little sense, on a prospective basis, to require a 
single substitute for LIBOR when the market may rationally prefer any of 
several viable alternatives.”238  Thus, we can move away from a world in 
which LIBOR, or a dominant benchmark, meets all market needs poorly, 
towards one where multiple benchmarks can each meet a specific market 
need more optimally.239 
Further empirical work could be undertaken on this score, in particular 
with respect to whether a single benchmark may in fact represent an optimal 
equilibrium.  Thus far, with the exception of a few commentators, the idea 
that markets may benefit from a greater variety of benchmarks has not 
received sufficient scholarly or regulatory attention.  For example, the first 
major step to overhaul the LIBOR submission system, the Wheatley Report, 
undertaken in the U.K., involved consideration of alternative benchmarks, 
including, among others, the Sterling Overnight Index Average and the 
Overnight Index Swap rates and repurchasing agreement rates.240  But the 
Wheatley Report ultimately recommended maintaining LIBOR, in large part 
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due to its sheer dominance.241  Since then, governments have only slowly 
moved to replacing LIBOR.  The United States, U.K., Europe, Japan, and 
Switzerland have begun to creakily transition to a designated alternative.242  
Yet the chosen alternatives are not free from flaws.  In the United States, as 
discussed, SOFR has been designated as LIBOR’s replacement.243  But as 
discussed above, the markets for SOFR can be finicky and prone to 
idiosyncratic fluctuations,244 and SOFR may be fundamentally suboptimal in 
certain circumstances—especially in times of economic stress—as well.  
Indeed, the very reason LIBOR came into existence was to avoid overreliance 
on a government-produced index.245 
In LIBOR markets, at least a few jurisdictions have since raised the 
possibility of transitioning to a two-benchmark status quo, where one is based 
on an overnight risk-free rate, while the other incorporates the credit risk 
component that enables banks to match their assets with their liabilities (e.g., 
their lending revenues with their borrowing costs).246  In the United States, 
the ICE Benchmark Administration has announced the intention to create a 
“a forward-looking, credit-sensitive benchmark designed specifically as a 
potential replacement for LIBOR for U.S. dollar lending activity,” although 
its viability remains uncertain.247  Another benchmark candidate, Ameribor, 
seeks to reflect the “the actual borrowing costs of thousands of small, 
medium, and regional banks across America.”248  There currently seems to 
be a window for innovation, one in which it makes sense to encourage 
benchmark competition, rather than simply let markets deal with the 
expensive fallout from transitioning to SOFR or relying on other suboptimal 
short term interest rates, such as the prime rate (which is a good deal more 
expensive than LIBOR), both of which would likely impose costs across the 
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market.249  This relates to another point: the argument that introducing 
multiple benchmarks would create additional, unmanageable complexity 
ignores the vast amounts of resources that are already being sunk into the 
transition from LIBOR to SOFR—including by the government.250  A clumsy 
transition risks externalized costs to the whole market. 
There is an additional, related benefit to benchmark competition: 
reduced risk of the persistence of an outdated benchmark.  For example, 
while LIBOR may have once reflected borrowing costs in liquid markets, 
over time trading in certain segments of the underlying market that LIBOR 
was designed to measure became problematically thin.251  Yet the BBA took 
no action in response, nor did they have any incentive to.  Why incur the costs 
of adjusting or updating a benchmark when markets have little ability to cease 
reliance on that benchmark?  Healthy competition in benchmark markets, on 
the other hand, could incentivize beneficial updates in response to changing 
market conditions.252  Thus, increased competition could have other 
cascading benefits, such as encouraging quality enhancing innovation. 
Finally, it is unlikely that additional benchmarks would cause a loss of 
the standardization, price-related, and hedging benefits provided by 
benchmarks in the first place.  This is presuming that markets will likely not 
calibrate to an equilibrium with more than a handful of benchmarks (too 
many competing benchmarks would undercut much of their standardizing 
benefits and run into administrability issues), ensuring that each will still 
retain substantial harmonization and pricing benefits.  While a full treatment 
of this eventuality is beyond the scope of this Article, the example in the 
cross-currency swap between Apple and Sony discussed in Part II.C.3 may 
be illustrative.  There, allowing parties to choose between two interest rate 
benchmarks that each maintain some critical threshold of market influence 
(rather than defaulting to LIBOR) should not negatively impact harmonizing, 
informational, and liquidity benefits of an alternative benchmark. 
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C. Transition Mechanisms 
Retaining the benefits introduced by benchmarks will require ensuring 
that the alternative benchmark has enough of a market, meaning that 
mechanisms of transition will need to be carefully considered.  Of course, 
transition toward additional benchmark usage is not a simple process, 
especially when network effects are so strong.253  Nor is it the purpose of this 
Article to detail a prescription for such processes.  However, a few insights 
that flow from this Article’s analysis bear mention.  First, the introduction of 
fees could significantly promote competitive incentives, both to create 
additional benchmarks and to adequately innovate around and update 
existing ones.  Second, the existence of “mix and match” compatibility across 
contracts could substantially help support such a system.  Finally, regulatory 
support may be necessary, as well as support from private market forces such 
as ISDA. 
Fees could greatly enhance the robustness of a multi-benchmark system 
in a few ways.  If benchmark promulgators or administrators were to charge 
fees, benchmark administrators might be incentivized to create and monitor 
rival benchmarks.254  To date, little incentive exists because new benchmark 
providers will be forced to internalize all costs with uncertain or partial 
benefits.255  The threat of competition as well as the inherent profit-seeking 
motives of benchmark administrators might also spur beneficial updates to 
existing benchmarks.  This parallels Rauterberg and Verstein’s insight that, 
because existing benchmarks are largely provided as byproducts of a bank’s 
main profit-making activity, the lack of a financial return lowers the incentive 
to monitor or innovate.256  It also ties in well with their proposal to bolster 
the intellectual property framework to allow benchmark providers to capture 
financial gains so as to incentivize better monitoring and quality control.257  
Indeed, the scheduled disappearance of LIBOR stems in part from the 
unwillingness of banks to continue providing inputs to the daily survey—
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largely because there is little financial upside and enormous downside due to 
unpredictable and expensive enforcement actions.258  Fee-based healthy 
competition could introduce enough of a financial incentive for participants 
to continue providing inputs.  Indeed, fees, or certain kinds of pricing 
schemes, are a recognized way of overcoming inefficient inertia.259 
Innovation could also be promoted through “mix-and-match 
compatibility.”260  As economists have noted, while unequal market power 
and monopolies tend to exist in markets with network effects, this is the truest 
when there is incompatibility between (potentially) competing networks.261  
Domowitz has also done work on this in the exchange context, discussing the 
“tipping” required to move from floor trading to electronic trading, noting 
the incompatibility between the two.262  This literature has generally 
demonstrated that with compatibility, social surplus is greater and 
“component” innovation is incentivized.263  This is because compatibility 
lowers switching costs and reduces coordination issues.264  Competition 
between multiple benchmarks can be thought of similarly, where there is 
compatibility between the contracts themselves, but with different 
benchmarks, leading to “mix-and-match compatibility [that] encourages 
component innovation.”265 
This “mix-and-match” compatibility can be observed in the equities 
markets.  Funds have a plethora of indices to choose from and pay licensing 
fees to those such as the S&P 500 for the ability to incorporate their indices.266  
Indices such as the Dow Jones Industrial Average and S&P 500 are “products 
for sale,” able to generate hundreds of millions of dollars in fees collected 
from those wishing to use the index (ETFs, for example).267  As they note, 
the “product” nature of equities indices has been able to reduce lock-in 
effects, allowing competition to exist between the S&P, the Dow Jones, and 
so forth for clients.268 
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Another lesson can be drawn from the equities universe.  Across stock 
exchanges, the order protection rule in Regulation National Market System 
(“NMS”) prohibits the execution of an order at an exchange if a better quote 
exists elsewhere.269  This not only protects investors, but it has the added 
benefit of promoting competition between exchanges by ensuring that the 
ability of an exchange to receive executions depends on its prices, not on its 
size or market power.  One could envision an analogous rule in benchmark 
markets as follows.  Dealers, in pricing contracts to counterparties, might 
charge less for incorporating a benchmark that is more widely used.  A newer 
benchmark will naturally have a smaller network of adoption and may be—
all else being equal—more expensive for an end user to select.  A rule 
requiring equal pricing for both benchmarks could remove dealers’ ability to 
discriminate against a new benchmark on the basis of cost.  If the market then 
deems that benchmark useful, that benchmark’s barriers to amassing 
additional market share are significantly reduced.270 
Governments might thus play a role (as they have already).271  Under 
regulation in the process of being implemented, the European Union has 
begun requiring that (a) benchmark administrators become authorized or 
registered, with adequate governance mechanisms in place; (b) benchmark 
contributors (of input data) must comply with the benchmark administrator’s 
code of conduct and avoid conflicts of interest; and (c) benchmark users only 
rely on authorized benchmarks, i.e., those included in the European Securities 
and Markets Authority Benchmarks Register.272  Such users will also need to 
have in place a written plan for contingency actions in the case of a 
benchmark materially changing or ceasing to be provided.273  To the extent it 
is feasible, benchmark users must also have an alternative benchmark as a 
substitute as necessary.274  The International Organization of Securities 
Commissions’ (“IOSCO”) Principles for Benchmarks encourage 
similarly.275  One can imagine that other jurisdictions may engage in 
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responsive action.276  As they stand, current contracts would either not have 
workable alternatives if LIBOR were stopped (such as cash products), 
convert to other instruments still tied to LIBOR, or revert to the prime rate 
(corporate loans), which would be a lot more expensive than LIBOR.277  
However, the kind of registration regime contemplated by the EU could 
facilitate the adoption of additional benchmarks.278  Registering with some 
centralized repository of “approved” benchmarks and requiring that 
benchmark users have contingency plans for alternative benchmarks could 
certainly bolster acceptance of alternative benchmarks.279 
Nor should the very same institutions—large dealers—that have had 
such a profound impact in shaping OTC market structures be overlooked.  
Dealers could encourage use of alternative benchmarks, lessening 
coordination and switching problems by leveraging the same market forces 
that led to such wide adoption of the original benchmarks promulgated.280  
For example, one group of institutions with a particularly influential and 
dynamic role in the interest rate derivatives market—ISDA—could help 
facilitate transition to alternative benchmarks, or lend legitimacy to 
additional ones, through the issuances of protocols.281  Currently, many older 
ISDA contracts provide that in the event that an IBOR is discontinued, 
calculations will depend on quotes obtained from major dealers in the 
market.282  This is most obviously problematic because the feasibility of 
obtaining such quotes under such circumstances is highly questionable, to 
say the least.  Contracts often contemplate a long schedule of future payments 
conditioned on future settings of a benchmark, and obtaining consistent, 
informative quotes for many years into the future seems unlikely as well as 
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time-consuming and costly.  However, one could imagine a scenario in which 
such contracts provided for a new reference rate as a fallback. 
Ultimately, while it is not the purpose of this Article to delineate specific 
frameworks for transitioning to multiple benchmarks, it bears mentioning 
that (a) a “mix-and-match” compatibility structure through which benchmark 
administrators could charge fees might incentivize benchmark promulgation 
and competition; (b) benchmark registration and regulation as to prices and 
fees could promote adoption of additional benchmarks, with additional policy 
intervention as necessary, without being too intrusive or requiring massive 
regulatory overhaul; and (c) market forces could help generate a new 
equilibrium, with subsequent updating and adjustments in response to 
changing market conditions. 
Finally, it is worth noting that these proposed reforms should not 
displace those aimed at strengthening monitoring and deterrence.  For 
example, certain regulators are already periodically reviewing submission 
and transaction data that is used to set benchmarks.283  Banks have been 
required to turn over large amounts of data in enforcement actions.284  Dealers 
could also provide data as to their exposure to a benchmark, which could 
provide information as to potential incentives to manipulate (the more 
exposure, the greater potential benefit).285  Moreover, it is possible that 
simply knowing that regulators have the option of accessing data or 
scheduling audits could deter wrongdoing.286  Similarly, regulators could 
consider installing monitors at dealer banks, a step that has already been taken 
by some regulators in some circumstances.287  With respect to cost, having 
this monitor be funded by the bank, or imposing potential liability or 
 
 283. See, e.g., Press Release No. 15-499, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 18 ’’(documenting 
that Deutsche Bank must retain a corporate monitor for three years); Press Release No. 6289-12, 
U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC Orders Barclays to pay $200 Million Penalty for 
Attempted Manipulation of and False Reporting concerning LIBOR and Euribor Benchmark 
Interest Rates’ (June 27, 2012), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/6289-12 (requiring 
Barclays to, among other things, install firewalls, retain communications and documents, audit and 
monitor submissions, regularly submit compliance reports to the CFTC). 
 284. Press Release No. 12-815, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Barclays Bank PLC Admits Misconduct 
Related to Submissions for the London Interbank Offered Rate and the Euro Interbank Offered Rate 
and Agrees to Pay $160 Million Penalty’ (June 27, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/barclays-
bank-plc-admits-misconduct-related-submissions-london-interbank-offered-rate-and. 
 285. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 14, at 821 (arguing that banks should disclose their 
exposure to benchmark administrators). 
 286. See, e.g., Rory Van Loo, Regulatory Monitors: Policing Firms in the Compliance Era, 119 
COLUM. L. REV. 369, 414–19 (2019). 
 287. See, e.g., Consent Order Under New York Banking Law Sections 39 and 44, In re Barclays 
Bank PLC, (NY State Dep’t of Fin. Servs. May 20, 2015), 
https://www.dfs.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2019/01/ea181218_barclays.pdf 
(noting the independent monitor installed at Barclays that will report to the DFS); Press Release No. 
15-499, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 18 (documenting that Deutsche Bank must retain a 
corporate monitor for three years). 
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sanctions if a monitor fails to report wrongdoing could be extremely 
effective.288   
Ultimately, the focus of any reforms should be on bolstering efficiencies 
already achieved in OTC markets and better aligning incentives.  An 
important means for doing this lies in encouraging multiple benchmarks in 
conjunction with any reform targeting the robustness of benchmarks. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article has advocated for a bottom-up approach to conceptualizing 
OTC market structures and their attendant efficiencies and inefficiencies.  By 
resisting the assumption that observed equilibria are the most optimal ones, 
this Article shows that the persistence of certain benchmarks should not be 
taken to necessarily indicate their desirability.  In markets that are otherwise 
opaque, decentralized, and dominated by a few powerful players, 
overreliance on default structures can lead to inefficient lock-in, facilitate 
wrongdoing, and reduce the effectiveness of discipline around benchmarks.  
In such markets, the network effects of benchmarks can be revolutionary, but 
can also entrench a single “default” benchmark across vast market segments.  
Thus, careful consideration should be given to alternative competitive 
equilibria containing multiple benchmarks.  The ambition of this Article is 
not to prescribe a number of benchmarks or detail a new competitive 
equilibrium—rather, it is to urge skepticism of current structures and 
demonstrate the benefits of additional benchmarks and different competitive 
equilibria. 
 
 288. See, e.g., Stavros Gadinis & Colby Mangels, Collaborative Gatekeepers, 73 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 797, 840–41 (2016). 
